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Notes on Henry Bugbee’s The Inward Morning 
These notes are from a course on Bugbee’s book:  Philosophy 390, Problems in Philosophy:  Henry 
Bugbee’s The Inward Morning, Winter Quarter 1979. 
I am grateful to the students who took the notes: 
Greg Barringer 
Pat Burke 
John Crist 
Rae Horan 
Jim Maher 
Dave Strong 
John Wagner 
 
I am equally grateful to the Staff of the Philosophy Department and to Rachel Smith in particular who in 
2019 transcribed the notes, preserved in a mimeographed copy, to a PDF. The mimeographed version is 
now in the Albert Borgmann Archive of the Mansfield Library of the University of Montana. A copy is 
also available at ScholarWorks at the University of Montana. 
I have checked the PDF against the mimeographed version and corrected obvious errors in either 
version. I have occasionally checked the PDF against The Inward Morning. 
I have replaced the gendered language of 1979 with gender-inclusive language, and I have made the 
format consistent. 
Underlined dates are those of The Inward Morning. 
Albert Borgmann 
 
 
John Wagner: 
January 9, 1979 
The theme of the book: Reality (focus and things in their own right) comes to us and graces us in its own 
right.   
Reality “does not arrive as a plane does;” sometimes it finds expression in the mode of recollection. 
Sometimes we are inadequately prepared for its arrival.   
Reality cannot be secured a priori, its appearance is spontaneous, it may withhold itself, it may be 
unrecognized, it may be recollected from memory. Reality can be earned but not steered.   
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Comments on Journal Form:  
Positive Aspects: Journal Form allows the convergence of life and thought; this convergence is liberating. 
The language is telling, forceful, vivid. Language as the expression of this convergence.   
Negative aspects: Frailty revealed, no place left to hide.   
Three modes of discourse:   
testimony: reality has come to pass (“good days”)  
struggle: one’s being unequal to reality makes itself felt (“bad days”)  
reflection: making room for reality  
Bugbee’s Preface  
p. 9 – the periodicity of life’s work.   
Perihodos, a coming around, a crux; one will either fulfill or default wherein one is held accountable for 
that which transpired, transpires, will transpire. Cf. Heidegger’s Kehre, the turn. Note the emphasis on 
rhythm: A flowing freely, flow of both the work and the years.   
p. 10 – the insight of meditations cannot be restrained. One must be open to them and allow them to 
depart, one doesn’t possess them. The most experiential are meditative; recollection is the presence of 
reality.   
“The present day – that is the dwelling of meditative thought.” (Par. 2, p. 10)  
Here lies the explanation of the Journal Form. Par. 3 suggests the ties between wonder and decision, 
liberty and liberality, ambiguity and finality.   
January 11, 1979 
p. 10 – “. . . finality proves to be the unifying theme of the work.” In dealing with the abstractness of 
“finality,” we can speak of the “abstract mode” of discourse. This mode allows us to connect up the 
concrete presence of reality with abstract philosophy. Relative to reality, the abstract mode is 
recollective and anticipatory; it allows one to philosophize without forcing meditation.   
Reality is realized in “true decision,” the appropriate response to reality.   
Finality is exposed in the response, response occurs “in the vein of wonder,” forming the will. True 
decision is a resolution, a decision not made but already decided. In this response to the decided, there 
arises freedom. A freedom of decisiveness, a calm.   
Henry’s example was the crisis that arises when a small ship must refuel in heavy seas. The 
apprehension moves into a commitment to “true decision” wherein the course necessary for success 
requires a closeness with finality. This may bespeak a certain kind of certainty. The resolution is a calm 
of true decision, final but not terminal. Henry referred to pp. 118-119 with regard to “true decision.”   
The spontaneousness of liberality in “true decision” negates the idea of indulgence, trying to make 
someone feel good.   
P. 11:  “Final word,” the embodiment of the universal spoken in a unique way. The universal: uni-
vertere, a turning into one; opposed to the use of universal as applying to all possible worlds and non-
particular world. In this latter respect universal has come to be homeless, without referent. H. Bugbee 
echoes the etymological roots “turning back into one.”   
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Noted was the prominence of the wilderness theme in the articulation of experience.   
 
Tuesday, August 26, 1952  
p. 33 – Philosophy and poetry must be built, standing on one’s own ground. (Heidegger’s “Building 
Dwelling Thinking.” “The local is the only universal, upon that all art builds.” The universal comes to be 
focused in the particular; the universal is grounded, similar to the connection Heidegger makes between 
the world and thing, cf. “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Poetry, Language, Thought,  p. 154: A bridge as 
a locus gives rise to space and to localities within space.   
  
John Crist: 
January 16, 1979 
The session opened with a question regarding the previous lecture.   
Greg noted a correlation between Henry’s statement that “a final word . . . is never said once for all,” (p. 
11) and Augustine’s point that God does not speak the world into existence once and for all.   
A discussion of freedom and true decision ensued.   
Ambiguity is tied to finality. Finality is a response to a decision (previously made). Who makes the 
decision?   
Decision is the moment of the focus of finality. A decision is a response, not arbitrary in nature, rather a 
person responds to the advent of some force. Decision, however, is bound to freedom and there must 
be an element of freedom in all decision. The freedom is not exercised arbitrarily, but it is freedom as a 
result of a force that passes through humans – freedom is the capacity for the advent of reality. Humans 
are the privileged place for this reality.   
True decision: “By finality I intend the meaning of reality as realized in true decision” (p. 10). Henry later 
says that in the case of the convict (p. 119) “To speak here of decision as ‘true’ would be redundant.”   
What is meant by true?   
In analytic philosophy only a proposition is true. To speak of a true decision would be regarded as 
absurd and confusing. The inquiry of analytic philosophy into truth looks, e.g., at the conditions for truth 
to arise form the combination of elementary propositions (Symbolic Logic). If the question of the truth 
of the components is raise, truth is defined as the agreement of a proposition with a state of affairs. This 
way of looking at truth seems restricted in that it only looks at the conditions for truth.   
We speak of philosophy as the ‘search for truth.’ We cannot mean truth merely in the sense of 
propositions that meet the truth conditions, rather we are searching for significant truth, truth that 
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matters. This is the notion of truth Henry means when he says, “By finality, I intend the meaning of 
reality as realized in true decision.”   
Some philosophers treat reality in the same way they treat truth. In the attempt to get hold of the 
conditions of reality, reality itself escapes us. In attempting to get hold on the conditions of truth we get 
only indeterminate truth.  
We must wrest truth from its indifference, and make it meaningful. We should find truth that is decisive, 
centers our lives. We must ask true questions – those that reveal decisive truth.   
True decision and freedom: Decision that is authentic has a consonance with a person’s situation as the 
person participates in the world. We have the power to respond inasmuch as we realize our destiny. All 
the efforts of Faulkner’s old man were  to acquit himself of his responsibility. If there is a flow to our 
destiny, we come to junctures of decisive resolution. In difficult matters we find ourselves becoming 
decided. The decisions come to fruition and we acknowledge them.   
Libertarian reply: The libertarians are at pains to extoll human eminence. Only if they stress freedom as 
uncausedness (not subject to any constraint) can they show human eminence. We need not wail over 
lack of freedom in the sense of arbitrary decision making. Humans can take pride and joy in experiencing 
themselves as the locus for true decision. We are in the world, and things work on us in a provocative 
mode. We don’t work against experiences, but we are called upon by them to respond with what is 
called for. The things we respond to, because of a deep searching, lead to true decision. This is our 
decisive work.  We are free indifferently in small things – matters of little consequence. As things 
become more important, we are less free (in the arbitrary mode) in our decisions. There is a gradation 
from indifference to eminence.   
Tuesday, August 26, 1952  
“Reflection is like tilling.”  
Tilling as:   
a. preparation of ground for planting,  
b. plowing under, risking the submergence of something that should remain above ground.   
How should we do philosophy as an activity?   
Last paragraph (p. 34): Can be seen as the circumscription of concrete philosophy.   
Sheltered philosophy is important for a time. We need not always be covering our tails, plugging all the 
holes. We need risk, adventure and openness in our philosophy.   
Should the advice Henry presents be given to a young student doing philosophy?   
Should the student be encouraged to “let it flow, write on, don’t give up when faced with miscarried 
thought.”   
1. Jim suggested that one risks getting a flow of flowery emotion, rather than a philosophy 
of substance when a young student takes this advice literally.   
2. It was suggested that Henry had assumed certain qualities in the student trying to do 
philosophy.  
1. They have a general background; they know how their thoughts stack up against 
what others have said; an apprenticeship of sorts has been served.  
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2. One takes responsibility for and has an honesty in one’s work.   
 
Wednesday, August 27  
How should we philosophize against those we know we must differ from? We should steer a middle 
course, away from professional subservience, but yet avoid dismissing what we must differ from. Take 
the philosophical community seriously, but do not unthinkingly accept its standards.   
Henry mentioned his suspicion that logicians get wrapped up in the security of logic, safe from the 
problems of logic in the context of philosophy as a whole.   
Affinity of Philosophy with Certainty: Certainty has a derivative and a fundamental sense.   
We do not escape certainty in philosophy. If we try to, we depend on a derivative or partial mode, even 
where it is fashionable to discover certainty in philosophy.   
Certainty cannot be owned and those who would (scientific method) require certainty by the means 
they use to attain it. They move from certainty to a method. The results of their investigation may be 
wrong, but the means by which the results are obtained are beyond question. They are easy-going 
about certainty – not so with their method.   
Positivist notion of certainty:  “Perhaps the last thing we should demand of an interpretation of 
certainty is that it show how we are entitled to some credo, one-for-all, incontrovertibly” (p. 36). 
Certainty is not quested for, but looked to as the base of sound action.   
Is certainty objectless? Certainty is not merely an emotional state denoting an object- the object is 
deeper and wider than either an object or a state of affairs. Certainty is a moment of eminent 
consonance with the world. We can secure the object in derivative or partial certainty; that certainty 
obliterates the context from which the object has sprung.   
The leaf on the pond (p. 45) focuses the world, but does not claim it.   
Certainty is not:   
• Objectless  
• Ineffable – we aren’t obliterated by reality.   
The sense of things comes to the fore in decisive action. Certainty is akin to hope and faith. In despair or 
weakness we see the world as veiled – we are separated from it. There is an intimation of reality behind 
the veil, so we have hope. Certainty also seems to be objectless when reality is ready to overtake us, but 
is not yet visible. And this is faith.   
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Pat Burke: 
January 18, 1979 
  
The class began with a review of where we had gotten so far with the questions of certainty. It was again 
noted that there are two senses of certainty. One that is fundamental of which Henry speaks in The 
Inward Morning and one that is derivative which has been the primary concern of contemporary Anglo-
American Philosophy. The derivative notion of certainty is concerned to explicate what one can be 
“certain of” or “certain that.” This usually takes the form of inquiries into the “given” which would give 
us an “incontrovertible warrant for particular truth claims” (35).   
In The Inward Morning, however, the fundamental sense of certainty is at issue. It is that certainty 
“which lies at the root of action that makes sense” (36). It “involves that simplicity which is true to being 
in a situation that is absolute and registered as such in depth” (37). Certainty in this sense can be said to 
be objectless, if by that we mean that it is not certainty concerning a specific, isolated object. But this 
certainty is not an emotional state of a subject. Rather, fundamental certainty arises out of our total 
involvement in the world.   
At this juncture Henry pointed out certainty’s kinship with faith and Tillich’s observation that doubt is 
the dialectical correlation of faith. In the same vein as Tillich, Henry observed that certainty would 
require an open and actively questioning nature. This seriously paradoxical nature of fundamental 
certainty results from the fact that what comes to us in certainty is not something we can be said to 
possess.   
Albert then compared the notion of certainty in The Inward Morning with Heidegger’s concept of 
resoluteness in Being and Time. In Being and Time, Heidegger leaves open that which we are resolute 
towards. This he fills out in his later writings. In The Inward Morning, however, resoluteness and that 
towards which we are resolute are intertwined. This again shows how Being and Time is a young man’s 
book in that it leaves many questions unanswered and how, in contrast, The Inward Morning is a mature 
book in that it tries to answer these questions.   
We moved next to a discussion of Thursday August 8, in particular, the passage: “So far as we are 
sensitive to the absoluteness of our situation, we live in a dimension of meaning which is the depth of 
our experience—we live in eternity” (37). The sense of absoluteness in this passage must be understood 
as universal in the sense we discussed previously, i.e., universal as applying to this particular world, not 
to all possible worlds. The absoluteness spoken of here is not that which absolves us from our situation 
in its particularity. Rather, it is our being absolutely bound into the situation. The sense of eternity in 
question would then be related to a traditional scholastic one: the gathering of all Being in an instant. 
However, it would not be an atemporal eternity as is the scholastic one. (Henry suggested here that the 
temporal sense of eternity meant in this passage could also be discerned in Beethoven’s last quartets.) 
One sense of eternity that would seem to be excluded entirely in this passage would be that of a future 
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life. Henry, however, suggested that perhaps this sense of eternity as a future life might be made 
intelligible if we reflected upon the Old Testament sense of being in a destinate situation. Eternity in this 
sense would be our involvement in a destinate situation with those who have come before and with 
those who are yet to come.   
Fundamental certainty’s kinship with Meister Eckhart’s notion of disinterestedness or poverty of spirit 
was introduced as another way to clarify what we are trying to get at here. In particular, passages in 
Eckhart’s Sermon where he discusses poverty of spirit as breaking through to our original uncreatedness 
seem to bear upon what is meant by certainty.   
“A man must become truly poor and as free from his own creaturely will as he was when he was 
 born . . . He alone has true spiritual poverty who wills nothing, knows nothing, desires 
 nothing.”   
Insofar as one attains spiritual poverty through abandonment of the will, one attains his original 
uncreatedness which is divine in nature. In uncreatedness a human is a partner of God and consonant 
with all of reality. In uncreatedness “there is no distinction of rank between a fly and an angel.” This 
uncreatedness is not mere homogeneity or unity but, rather, it is where we and all things exist as we 
essentially are.   
Insofar as the uncreatedness is attained or recognized, God as the creator ceases to exist. He is no 
longer something apart from his creation. This point of Eckhart’s can perhaps be understood if we 
consider that in wonder God would not be an object as he is in explanation. Insofar as we try to explain 
how God and the world come alive in wonder, we in some measure transcend our will and createdness. 
It is this attainment of uncreatedness and the consequent consonance with all of reality which is the 
recognition of the “absoluteness of our situation” that gives rise to the rock bottom certainty of which 
The Inward Morning speaks.   
Tom observed the similarity between Eckhart’s notion of disinterestedness and the Buddhist concern 
with the transcendence of desire. In order to transcend desire in the Eastern sense, it would seem 
necessary to return to our original uncreatedness. Our uncreatedness would be the point where we 
were free from desire because it would be the origin of desire.   
Henry agreed that this would seem to be the case because insofar as we attain to uncreatedness, we are 
purged of all egoism or self-centeredness. He also noted that D.T. Suzuki recommended Eckhart as the 
best person to turn to in the Western tradition in order to begin to understand the Buddhist tradition.   
Albert, here, noted the connection between the experience of ourselves as uncreated and the 
experience of our imperishability. That is, the experience that in human beings something is happening 
that will not pass. If this is a genuine experience, it would have an important bearing on our discussion 
of eternity. However, it needs to be pointed out that while this is a common experience in Christianity, 
the Greeks were not nearly so confident. This is shown in the agreement which the Athenians had to 
celebrate one another so that they would not die. In particular, Greek heroes were concerned to find 
poets who would sing their praises, to prevent them from falling into forgetfulness.   
Henry pointed out that in the Gospel of St. John it is stated without qualification that “eternity is to 
know God.”  
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The discussion of August 28 was concluded by Albert with the remark that while he found Henry’s 
discussion of eternity and living on congenial, he would still like to leave the issue open. In particular, 
the experience of incorruptibility still seemed to require further reflection.   
We moved then to the entry of August 29 and its theme of wonder as the cause of philosophy. In this 
entry, it is noted that both Plato and Aristotle recognized wonder as the beginning of philosophy. Henry, 
however, is particularly concerned with the way in which Aristotle interprets wonder – possibly 
confusing it with curiosity. The passage in question is:   
 “For it is owing to their wonder that humans both now begin and at first began to philosophize; 
 they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated 
 difficulties about the greater matters, e.g., the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun 
 and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And  humans who are puzzled and 
 wonder think themselves ignorant (where even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of 
 wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to 
 escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know and not for any 
 utilitarian end.” (Meta. 982b 12-23)  
Aristotle seems to be suggesting here that the wonder that marks the inception of philosophy is allayed 
by the knowledge concerning that which first caused us to wonder. It was noted though that other 
interpreters of Aristotle (Heidegger in What is Philosophy?) do not think that Aristotle here wishes to say 
that our initial wonder at reality is allayed by philosophical knowledge.   
For Aristotle, however, there would be one thing that would be a source of incorrigible wonder – the 
unmoved mover. The contemplation of the unmoved mover is for Aristotle Theoria and is the highest to 
which humans can attain. If the beholding of the unmoved mover is to be the very sustenance of life, 
then it must be inexhaustible and incapable of being possessed, i.e., it is not something that we 
contemplate in order to understand. Thus for Aristotle Theoria and wonder are not the same, and they 
are the core of the good life. This is reflected in Aristotle’s Ethics where all the practical virtues are 
secondary to Theoria. Only Theoria gives us the comprehensive view of the world, in light of which we 
might properly situate ourselves within the world. Only insofar as we attain Theoria do we become 
citizens of the world for Aristotle, and come to inherit our full humanity.   
Aristotle’s sense of becoming fully human through the attainment of Theoria seems to parallel Henry’s 
notion of wonder at that which perseveres, which then deepens into certainty, this certainty being the 
ground of all action that makes sense.   
We moved then to a discussion of August 30 and the nature of explanation. Albert began with Nicolaus 
of Cusa’s discussion of explanation in On Learned Ignorance and in The Defense of Learned Ignorance. In 
these treatises, he makes the distinction between Intellect and Reason (however, with the opposite 
evaluation given these terms by Kant). Reason for Nicolaus is that which is that which is concerned to 
give discursive explanation in the sense Henry takes up with in this entry. Reason is digressive in that it 
goes on forever never taking in the whole. It discerns continually expanding pairs of opposites or 
contradictories with reference to that which is to be explained. The intellect however sees the 
coevidence of opposites and thus is able to know the whole.   
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It was noted that Nicolaus’s descriptions of the intellect seem to be close to what Henry says of the final 
word in the Preface. The final word is not the mere correlative or contrary of another, i.e., it is not that 
which reason offers us in Nicolaus’s terminology. Rather, it results from the operation of the intellect, 
i.e. it has to do with the coincidence of opposites and the discernment of the whole. Nicolaus speaks of 
contradictories whereas the final word is not the contrary of another.    
Albert then gave us a short etymology of both digressive and discursive in order to obtain some 
suggestions as to what discursive explanation might be. The root dis meaning through, across or apart, 
and currere, meaning to run. It was noted that while they are etymological twins, in common usage 
discursive carries the positive connotation and digressive the negative. Generally, by discursive we mean 
doing things one at a time in an orderly fashion. Digression, however, usually connotes aimlessness or 
distraction.   
Henry in this entry, however, speaks of discursive explanation as digressive without being aimless. In 
what sense then is discursive explanation perhaps fundamentally digressive? It is digressive in that it is 
dependent on both what is to be explained and a context. In particular, it is digressive in that it fails to 
reach to where things come to be present and thus fails to give expression to this presence. It is not 
expressive of that which holds one in wonder and renders one reflectively disposed.   
This point was clarified by taking Carl Hempel’s sense of explanation as a model of such discursive 
explanation. For Hempel, explanation is fundamentally the subsumption of a particular under a general 
law. The particular thing or event must first be cast into sentential force. Explanation then consists of 
bringing this sentential bit of reality under a scientific law. The particular thus comes to be primarily an 
instance of scientific laws. It is not, however, even a concrete instance but, rather, only the sentential 
slice in such an instance. 
Although this type of explanation points out the steadiness and reliability of reality, it is dependent in at 
least two ways. First, the general scientific laws apply to all physically possible worlds. They say nothing 
about the particular world in which we live. Our particular world is only one of many possible worlds 
contained within the possibility space circumscribed by the laws. The peculiarity of our world only enters 
in when we first use the specific conditions which the laws then explain. Thus what makes the laws 
pertinent to our world must be brought to the laws. Secondly, there must be a context that draws our 
attention to what is worthy of explanation. If we thought solely in terms of the scientific laws, what we 
brought to the laws for explanation would be totally indifferent. We might as well study the physical 
properties of a randomly chosen cubic foot of space as we try to find a cure for cancer.   
At this point it was noted that, for Hempel, only what is subsumable under laws is intelligible. This 
connection between intelligibility and lawfulness has been endorsed by other thinkers including 
Aristotle. However, for Aristotle, the laws under which the particulars are subsumed are themselves 
already a reflection of this particular world. They bespeak the presence of the actual world in which we 
live. Modern scientific laws, in contrast, are indifferently related to our world. They only give us the 
possibility conditions for the existence of particular types of entities.   
We concluded at this point with the promise that we would take up with how the incompleteness of 
Hempelian explanation has come to show itself in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy.   
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Jim Maher: 
January 23, 1979 
Sunday, August 3 
This is the last of six continuous entries developing the main theme of the book. The main point of this 
entry is to contrast the spirit of openness with its opposite condition, i.e. , contraction, rigidity, and 
deadness of spirit.   
There are essentially two ways in which we can fail to be open:   
1. Failure to be open is painful and frustrating. We realize we are not open and that we 
must struggle to be free and open for the advent of reality.   
2. Failure to be open solidifies into a professional stance. The failure to be open to the 
advent of reality is as sure a mark of failure as are contradictions or inconsistencies. 
Philosophical practice in journal articles centers on the uncovering of inconsistencies and 
not on the failures of a rigid viewpoint. Dr. Borgmann commented on the fact that modern 
ethical systems are sometimes constructed and evaluated with consistency as the criterion 
for validity. The question of the foundation of rights is often not even raised. The further 
point was made that philosophical discourse in the U.S. is stunted because it is unable to 
raise the question as to whether a philosophical essay has been open or suffers from 
rigidity. This is because the charge of inconsistency can be made to stick, whereas deadness 
of spirit cannot be made to stick.   
Dr. Birch commented that the only argument in philosophy is the ad hominem argument. He further 
stated that H.D. Thoreau was onto the deadness of spirit in American thought in that he stated that 
there is a difference between philosophers and professors of philosophy. Dr. Borgmann commented 
that the ad hominem argument should be directed to the person and the world which is shared. An 
appeal to a common world is necessary to show deadness of spirit.   
Friday, September 5  
This entry is an interlude. It is a summary and introduction to entries of September 7 through 
September 12.   
This entry raises the problem of experience. Appeal is the essential factor in philosophical discourse 
based on experience, and intimacy is the crucial feature of discourse based on experience. The life of 
experience can flourish in intimacy. However, there is a breakdown in intimacy through much of 
experience.   
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In modern philosophy experience is thought of with a view towards securing objects.   
Main argument of this entry: We talk about objects as being bits of reality. Any such example of an 
object can be challenged. This is embarrassing if our desire is to possess objects and have them assured. 
The attempt at possession of objects has not been totally successful if it can be challenged.   
The motto of the early phenomenological movement was “Zu den Sachen selbst,” an attempt to secure 
the givenness of things. Dr. Bugbee commented that for Plato experience engenders wonder and 
reflection. Experience is not that which settles disputes. Dr. Borgmann commented that this is why the 
Dialogues often end in a myth. The myth is the central disclosure.   
Main point: Reality escapes the possessive mode. We realize we can’t possess objects, so we turn to 
what we can possess. D. Hume already restricts himself to possessing impressions. It is believed that 
assurance and possession can be gained by analyzing a thing down into its least parts, e.g. you have very 
little in sense data, but you are assured of that little bit. This reduction is to a more modest and less 
committed claim. However, the thing is lost.   
In modern philosophy the futility of attempting to secure reality in these little ‘bits’ has come to the 
fore. These bits are still too highly charged, i.e. , unwarranted claims must be made. We cannot get 
away from ties to a larger world.   
The idea of presuppositionless building blocks has been given up, except in scientific thought. Molecules 
and atoms are still assured and resorted to in science. There is a problem with this which is difficult to 
put one’s finger on.   
Possessiveness felt in philosophy must be taken seriously. It is indicative of a more general 
possessiveness in which we deal with our world. Heidegger states that possessiveness is part of our 
destiny. We are caught in its thrall. However, there is another kind of thinking which is open to the tides 
and flows of each day. Our first destiny is not inevitable. The second alternative is openness to things in 
their own right. Heidegger is not a determinist.   
Dr. Bugbee commented that the insistent expectation of being confronted by reality is a possession of 
reality. If we try to make reality stand fast we lose it. Dr. Borgmann stated that possessiveness can creep 
into our experiences. We may posit that reality should be ‘such and such’ to meet our expectations. In 
this way we lose reality.   
The last point in this entry makes the transition to a series of sketches in the next entry.   
The contrast is drawn between objectivity and experience. Things are whittled down enough to be 
handed down in objectivity. This allows for progress in science and technology. However, experiences 
cannot be possessed or passed down, but must be regained and relearned.   
Receiving a scientific heritage makes us feel powerful when we are really not.   
Sunday, September 7 – Friday, September 12   
Immersion and commitment are more than just figures of speech. They occur in the sketches.   
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The book itself (The Inward Morning) is concrete. In it reality comes to pass in memory. Memory is not 
here conceived of as a subjective psychological phenomenon. Memory is not selected by us, 
idiosyncratic and separate from reality.   
There is a challenge to do justice to memory in light of subjective and psychological modes of 
understanding. Memory, far from being a subjective coloration of reality, is the place where truth of 
reality can flourish and come into the open. Memory is the capacity to take in reality and let it flourish. 
German ‘bewahren’ means to preserve, to keep. Root is ‘wahr,’ i.e., true. Memory is not just to keep, 
but to allow to attain its truth.   
Dr. Bugbee commented that memory has initiative. One obeys the initiative more than one can wish to 
command it. Dr. Borgmann commented that memories, even if they are thought to reside in us, 
continue to live and grow even if we do not remember them explicitly. Remembrances have often 
grown when we go back to them.   
First Sketch on Swamping : Swamping is seasonal, tied into the rhythm of the year. It is a senseless 
activity, not in that it is stupid or arbitrary, but in that it cannot be easily made sense of. It is not easily 
subsumed into wider categories. There is a certain scandalousness to swamping. There is a tone of 
relentless denial to the land. Trout season is ahead and the land is not alive with animals. The pervasive 
feeling is of ‘not yet.’   
What life there is heightens the senselessness of the scene. Wind is the one movement which is apt in 
this situation as it plays around in the emptiness. The pines are inane in their greenness, while the bare-
limbed trees are consonant with the scene.   
The beginning movements into the swamp are uncertain and probing. There is an awareness of 
unreliability. The dead and gray landscape invites in a forbidding manner. One first responds by probing 
and trying to stay dry. Slowly this gives way to immersion and commitment. There is no plan to get 
oneself wet. There is a gradual entry and being drawn into the swamp. The force of the invitation is 
brought home to one. It could not be otherwise. One is inevitably drawn into the swamp.   
 
Dave Strong: 
January 25, 1979 
Tuesday’s discussion began by referring back to Hempel’s theory of explanation in order to show how 
the insufficiency of this theory which Henry exposes has been noted in analytic philosophy also. Wes 
Salmon bids us to consider a problem such as: Why is the flagpole 20 feet all? To give an explanation to 
this problem according to Hempel we need:   
1. A set of laws with empirical significance  
2. Special conditions  
3. A conclusion following from these premises  
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So, first we find a formula relating the angle of a light source and the length of a shadow. Secondly, we 
measure the angle of the sun and the length of the shadow cast by the flagpole. Then after applying the 
formula to these special conditions we know why the flagpole is 20 feet tall. But, Salmon argues, is that 
really an explanation? A better explanation might be that a 25 foot pole was purchased and then set in 
the ground five feet. So in giving explanations there is a problem of relevance. It is not just a matter of 
subsuming particulars under laws; the subsumption must be relevant.   
Achinstein argues that there are four or five ways to give an explanation to the question: Why did John 
Doe contract the flue in London, January 12th, 1978? The different explanations depend on what 
emphasis is put forward in the sentence, e.g., emphasizing flu or London. He argues that we cannot give 
an explanation without holding to a standard of relevance.   
Although these philosophers pointed out the deficiency of Hempel’s theory, like typical American 
philosophers, they did not pursue answers to the questions: What in the end crucially makes us insist on 
this explanation rather than that? And how does this insistence come from the world at large? As 
paradigms of relevant explanations, Henry cited Socrates’s explanation in the Crito and Phaedo why he, 
Socrates, was to stay in prison and Guillaume’s explanation in Saint Exupery’s Wind, Sand, and Stars how 
he was able to overcome fatigue and cold.   
To contrast the wilderness experience in “Swamping,” John Crist told about his favorite cirque lake. The 
surroundings invite and hold you into it as in an amphitheater. It is life-giving; everywhere are signs of 
life and the fullness of the wilderness. It was felt that a kind of anticipation which demands grandeur 
would corrupt this place. This possessiveness is often exemplified by our checklist reports of wilderness 
experiences.   
This example allows us to see the peculiar force of “Swamping.” By its deadness, the landscape is 
stripped of all obvious attractiveness. The venturer is stripped of his reluctance, of keeping dry. He 
becomes immersed in simplicity. The point is the stark simplicity and honesty in this encounter. “There 
was no mistake about the gladness of being in the swamp.”  
This early sketch prefigures matters that come to the fore again at sea. (See pages around p. 180.) There 
the author feels the crazed enormity of the demands and the sting of craziness and wretchedness in the 
tasks. He feels put upon and indignant about this labor ‘wanting in righteousness’ (Virgil’s labor 
improbus). Yet he is drawn into it and finally feels glad.   
The first part of “Building a Dam” is a description of the setting. A small stream runs through a meadow, 
but not just through it – at one point the stream is marked by a ledge and old maple. The idle building is 
an innocent and genuine response to this place that stands out – the building heightens this natural 
feature. It is a response to this place, not an engineering exercise – they built the dam wrong. But by 
building it wrong they could capture the water as in a cupped hand; the dam embraces the water. They 
were not damming the stream to get it under their control. In the interplay between responding and 
play, the response deepens into work in earnest; the dam attained a considerable height.   
Now it became an attraction for others. The builders felt they had to start giving reasons for why they 
were building the dam. Skating, fishing, swimming. But the reasons were only intended to deflect the 
inappropriate questions of the others’ curiosity.   
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Yet they did feel a bit defensive, so they planted some fish. The fish take up residence in their own right 
and disclose the pool more fully. It was noted that the seeing of animals in nature often discloses the 
fertility and wildness of the land, and the features of the landscape in a unique way. And so the darting 
fish show the depths of the pool and hidden places under the ledge.   
Nature takes kindly to the dam and accepts it. Wildflowers and grasses grow upon it. The fish belong to 
the pool. The builders commit themselves to the cool blur. Immersion is in the background. These relate 
back to the main themes of these sketches.   
Now that there is a place in the landscape, the ultimate concentration of everything in simplicity can 
take place with the one leaf from the flaming maple in an instant touch upon the water. Here is the 
concentration of everything into one.   
Finally, it never did serve a purpose in a way the curious people wanted.   
Selections were read from “The Thinker as Poet” and “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” in Poetry, Language, 
Thougt. In the latter essay, Heidegger, in a forceful way that sweeps up the world in all its variety, shows 
how it is all gathered into a bridge. He takes gigantic steps whereas building a dam is more innocent and 
muted. Therefore Heidegger’s account is older, so to speak; The Inward Morning lies between Being and 
Time and the later works of Heidegger. 
Heidegger’s account is occidental in that he sees cultural things, such as bridges, as world-bearing 
things. The dam is also a work of culture, but it is reclaimed by nature; grass and wildflowers grow on it. 
So this is a very American account.   
We covered the first of the two parts on “Rowing.” In contrast to “Swamping,” this account begins 
auspiciously with the words “first possessed me.” In this first part the integrity of competitive rowing is 
apparent and tempered by touches of irony. The young man is in the position of the lower class as he 
looks on with awe at the higher class: the classy racing shells, the varsity rowers with their high level of 
skill and refinement, the inexperience of the freshmen. There is the ‘clear’ standard of achievement, the 
ladder, and the subtle ways the coaches could foster an interest. This account is not to be taken with 
dead seriousness though. Rowing turned out to be something ‘more and other.’  
 
Greg Barringer 
January 30, 19 
The class began with a recounting of what was said towards the end of the class on January 25 regarding 
the first part of the sketch on “Rowing,” i.e.,  up to the second paragraph beginning on page 47 (“But 
rowing turned out to be something else again . . .”). Noted first in connection with this first section was 
the “aura of elitism” which abounds in the sport as seen in the “classy shells,” the polished precision of 
the “master,” the hierarchical ladder of the organization from the varsity at the top to the beginners at 
the bottom. Implicit in this elitism is the honed edge of competition: the goals to be strived for, the 
reaching for a higher rung of the ladder, and the races themselves.   
15 
 
  
Noted next was the way in which this preliminary account of the sport is suspended between innocence 
and irony. The innocence is that of the author in the way he takes up with the awe-inspiring yet 
unquestioned integrity of the sport – as if it were the elaborate overt  structure of the sport which calls 
one to rowing. The irony appears in certain phrases – and in each case, though there is no criticism, the 
irony seems to point to the existence of something more crucial, more focal. An example of this might 
be the last few lines of the last paragraph beginning on page 46 and ending page 47 wherein the 
beginners are told that at least two results from rowing are “good-fellowship and fine health.” The 
author writes: “Well, as it turned out, it wasn’t a bad bunch there . . . , and the case for health was plain 
enough. . . “ There is no critique of the claims, but yet there seems to be something missing: though the 
claims proved true enough, they still lack focality. The irony, then, acts as a pointer to something more 
focal.   
“But rowing turned out to be something else again, something more and other than anyone pointed to 
or made prominent.” (p. 47) Heeding this, the class turned to the figure of John Schultz, “the awakener.” 
The man himself serves as a reminder that there is something other to rowing than the elaborate 
structure, being out of the “mainstream” of the hierarchy as he was the rigger and the sculling coach.   
We turned to the events surrounding the race on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, when John Schultz 
and the author followed the race in the former’s car. The part of interest in this part of the sketch is 
when John S. and the author surged ahead of the race to a “chosen” spot: “When they come out from 
under that bridge . . . that’s where they need me!” (p. 49) The culmination of this event comes with the 
yell:  “R-r-r-o-o-o-o-w!” The point in this exclamation was that John Schultz, and the yell, was to the 
rowers as was the dam to the creek and dam builders in the preceding sketch. As with the dam, the 
locality from which the yell was to emanate was already “chosen.” The yell, like the dam, gathered the 
efforts of the rowers into an inspired unison – into an ultimate commitment and immersion. But this call 
to commitment and immersion did not only affect the ones rowing. The author later tells John Schultz 
that it no longer mattered to him, though he was earlier despondent, that he was not in the race as a 
rower. John replied: “’You was there.’” (p.50)  
 Furthermore, this immersion was not limited to races proper. Here we turned to the account of the long 
practices. At the end of these practices John Schulz would greet the incoming rowers with similar 
exhortations, who, after rowing six long miles, more often than not resisted the call as if saying: “What 
more does he want!” “There were rare occasions, however, when those six miles would round out into 
an incorruptible song . . . “ (p. 51)  
The point was then made that the “Rowing” sketch appears as a paradigm gatheredness, commitment, 
immersion. This was followed by such questions as: does such a claim belittle the significance of the 
sketch? Is rowing a school/preparation for life, or is it the center of life itself – and if so, how comes it to 
be thus? A discussion ensued in which rowing was compared and contrasted to working for “Social 
justice.” The later, on the face of it, seems to be far more serious and worthwhile than the former. But 
one must not forget that working for “social justice” is merely a means for a more fruitful, decisive, 
meaningful end; that is, rowing is a focality, a centrality, a gatheredness. One was not a practitioner of 
rowing with the intention of applying this practice to other aspects of life. One rows only to row. Yet the 
experience of rowing, as an end in itself, emanates – or radiates – through all experience.   
With the closing remark that “Rowing,” the sketch, was a good account of gatheredness as it shows the 
one-rootedness of the disparate constituents (practices, races, work, play, competition, etc.) we moved 
to the next entry.   
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Tuesday, September 23  
The preliminary point was that this entry is an account of the preceding sketches, an account in the 
abstract mode about the concrete events in the sketches.   
Noted in the first paragraph of the entry was the notion that in immersion the immersed one 
comprehends himself as being absorbed in a “universal situation.” The absorption is not a narrowing 
down, a separation. Rather, it is broadening, far-reaching. Here, again, is the notion of the emanation or 
radiation of meaning as it dawns in immersion, absorption. “ . . . it is as if one’s perception of everything 
distinct were engaged in alignment with a center from which one moves to greet each thing knowingly. 
There is a continuing passage from thing to thing in which a kind of sameness or continuity of meaning 
deepens . . . “ (p. 52).   
We then turned to examine that “center from which one moves” by way of focusing on three notions of 
“focus”: the first being etymological – focus, in Latin, means hearth; the second being an optical term – 
“focus” being that point at which light is gathered (as with a concave reflecting mirror); the third being a 
photographic term – “focus” being whence a perfect image ensues. Focus, then, can be construed as a 
place for possible gatherings (the hearth being the “meeting place” in a home), a bringing to one (as the 
focal point of a concave mirror), and a bringing to clearness (as with a camera). Thus with a central/focal 
experience, the meaning which dawns with that experience radiates into and imbues all other things 
with meaning – always referring back to that focus.   
 
Rae Horan: 
February 1, 1979  
The crucial question concerning “Rowing:” “Is Rowing a school for life or life itself?” Mr. Borgmann 
posits that we should accept the claim that Rowing is life itself. He then raises a further more difficult 
question: “If we accept that Rowing is life itself, when and where does this happen?” We are reminded 
of Henry’s point, that meaning (often) comes through recollection and not (necessarily) on the occasion 
of physical happening.  
A further question from Mr. Borgmann: When these reflections came to full flower was it September, 
1952, or is it every time The Inward Morning is thoughtfully read and understood? The question is not 
particularly vexing for an idealist. Ideal meanings can be instantiated in space and time at any point. The 
idealist plugs into timelessness and ideal meaning. But this is at odds with the concrete nature of 
(experience and) meaning, and the particularity that is always stressed.   
Mr. Borgmann locates the primacy of these meanings in the actual physical transaction. The experience 
lives on in memory, flourishes and develops, the meaning sometimes emerging anew in reflection.   
Mr. Borgmann asks: “Where in time and space do we locate this focus?” It would be naïve to say on 
whatever day the students rowed; in that case Henry’s account would merely be a record of that 
meaning. If we are to believe that meaning only comes fully to the fore when we reflect, the meaning of 
rowing was only crudely and undevelopedly present when the students were rowing. If we accept this 
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we still have to ask if the meaning is in the writing – the actual moment that Henry wrote; the proofs, 
the drafts; the published work when people reflect on it?   
Crist speaks of the difficulty of locating meaning in space and time. He speaks of cross-country skiing in a 
meadow and asks: “Is meaning in me, or out there and I am feeling it, or a combination of both?”  
Mr. Borgmann answers that it is his inclination to locate the meaning in the meadow. The subject is the 
recipient. Once the subject is allowed as a contributor or author of meaning, subjectivism becomes 
inevitable. We can only invite people into our great experiences if we are convinced that “there is 
something out there.” This tends to take us towards a realistic (and concrete) account of meaning. 
Taken further, meaning is just reality – reality having spoken in its own right.   
Friday, September 26 – Saturday, October 18  
An account of the remainder of the first year, set off by the influence of professional concerns. The 
question of ethics engages the author’s mind and draws him away from the earlier fluency of the days 
and works. The author’s concerns are still tied to the theme of the emergence of reality, but now 
themes are dealt with in an abstract mode: the space between the primary experience of reality and the 
work of philosophers that pertains to such experience.   
Empirical knowledge and technical skill, unlike experience, can be “possessed,” even though such 
knowledge and skill are arrived at through experience.   
Mr. Borgmann makes an analogy between experiences that are basic for ethics, and experiences basic 
for empirical knowledge and skill on the one hand and performance and practice, seriousness and 
playfulness on the other.   
Practice can be stopped and started over again. This is not something that can be done in performance 
or the notion of performance becomes absurd. In performance the chips are down – you stand or fall in 
your performance – it is serious.   
Is it possible to be playful in ethical inquiry? Yes. There is always the positing of cases. The choosing and 
sustaining of possibilities. But Henry says that this is inappropriate to ethical inquiry: (pg. 54-55 The 
Inward Morning)  
“Can we really fix in mind that of which we would improve our understanding in ethical 
inquiry? Suppose we would inquire into human well-being, for example. Can we 
command the experience with which such an inquiry might be concerned? Or have we 
only to remember, as we remember objects and processes, in order that experience 
may afford concrete purchase for reflective interpretation of well-being? But if the 
experiential meaning of well-being were thus at our disposal, should we not also be able 
to select and control experience so as to insure our well-being?”  
Can we get ethical experience under control, as empirical knowledge can be controlled, applied, 
possessed?   
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In the way that practice cannot overtake performance, the reproductive sense of “What if this were the 
case” cannot overcome ethics. There is the possibility of reflecting in a playful mode about ethics. But 
this mode will never get us to the crucial point of ethics wherein we are at stake in our actions, and our 
actions count for something.   
Henry makes obvious references to Kant with two terms: “categorical imperative” and “technical skill.” 
Kant: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. There are two kinds of imperatives. Categorical and 
hypothetical. Hypothetical imperatives are subdivided into technical rules (imperatives of skill), and 
pragmatic counsels (imperatives of prudence). Categorical imperatives deal strictly with ethics. 
Hypothetical imperatives have conditions attached. (e.g.: “If you want to split wood, sharpen your ax.” 
This is a technical rule.) Counsels of prudence all have the same conditions attached. (“If you want to be 
happy then budget your money.” “If you want to be happy, then eat in moderation.”)  
Kant did not think one should base one’s ethical behavior on happiness because happiness can elude 
one. One could be bitterly disappointed and cease to behave ethically. Happiness is not what should be 
strived for, but the worthiness of being happy; in this way one cannot be disappointed – even if one is 
unhappy.   
Ethical action cannot be tied to any condition: it (ethical action) has an absolutely demanding character 
(unconditional imperatives). This character is systematically held at bay when one participates in games, 
discussions, etc.   
Henry would challenge Kant when he says that pure reason is independent of empirical reality. The 
categorical imperative is not a purely formal matter independent of material considerations but issue 
from the claim of reality. Mr. Borgmann finds this to be an appropriate rethinking of Kant’s insight.   
Ethical action only has life and substance when there is flow in our lives – fluency, rhythm, when ethical 
action flows of its own accord then demands are placed upon us which are categorically imperative. We 
are true to the nature of ethics only when we step outside playfulness. The ethical quality of a person’s 
life is the specificity of that life. If a person is capable of articulating concrete experiences then that is 
what he should talk about. Speaking in the concrete mode is putting a claim on people: “Here is 
something I want you to take account of; it is control.”   
If this talk (of concrete experience) is not articulate, it can become cloying, sentimental, pornographic, 
flatfooted, and it will offend the listener. The categorically imperative quality of our lives cannot always 
come to the fore because demands of discretion and style must be met. There is an abstract mode 
where the concrete is just thinly veiled, and one can be true to that. It is not necessary for everyone to 
speak of their youth or tell war stories, but the experience must be present behind the work as an 
outline.   
Marcel’s notion of the ‘metatechnical’ is a step beyond techniques that allows one to take account of 
experience. (pg. 55, The Inward Morning)   
“Action and reflection on the point of action are both meta-technical, over and above 
whatever technique may enter into them. And for convenience let us use a similar term, 
and say that they are both meta-objective in the sense that they move in a dimension of 
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meaning over which we cannot exercise the power of representation and control that 
obtains with respect to things in taking them as objects.”  
This must not be taken to relieve one of the need for rational discussion. This is not the same as the 
annoying Eastern attitude that dismisses problems by saying that there is the “translogical,” etc. There is 
a particular style of thinking that goes through the technical and then realizes that that’s as far as one 
can go. There is a closely reasoned argument that shows us that to remain in the realm of argument is to 
stay in a limited realm.   
The spontaneous arising of memory through involuntary recall speaks of the connection between 
memory and fidelity. In memory humans are able to gather time and the world – in seeing a person one 
has known for a long time we see  that person in that person’s thirty-fifth year, but we also see the 
person as she or he grew out of the preceding twenty-five years. One is not looking at a time slice (as a 
physicist), but rather how the present has grown out of the past, how the past has been gathered and 
saved. Fidelity comes in here: to be true to a thing in its temporal extension.   
Fidelity, like focus, is an antidote to distraction. Humans are open to the entire world. The world is open 
to the entire person. The person can range over the entire world and this can lead to distraction or 
aimless wandering. Humans can thus be scattered in a ways that an animal cannot. Animals always 
occupy a certain niche. Fidelity is the counter force to distraction and scatteredness. Distraction is being 
torn in all directions.   
Sunday, September 28  
The quotes “understand in order to believe,” and “Believe in order to understand,” are taken from 
Anselm of Canterbury, from the close of the first chapter of the Proslogion.   
There is a horrible tradition in analytical philosophy: knowledge is true justified belief; this is consonant 
with ‘I understand so I can believe,’ resulting in knowledge.   
“I seek understanding so I may be entitled to belief” – if this is reasonable, the converse must seem 
unreasonable. How can belief come prior to understanding?   
 
John Wagner: 
February 6, 1979 
The entry of September 28 reflects on Anselm’s maxim “I believe in order to understand.” He explicitly 
says “unless I believed I should not understand.” The question arises: “How can we believe in something 
we don’t understand?” Western thought generally skirts this question in not reflecting on the concrete 
conditions which may underlie the activity of inquiry; in this way the object of inquiry is limited. I.A. 
Richards suggests that philosophy may not have a subject-matter of its own. And to be sure, profound 
experience is not a subject matter amenable to objective representation and deliberate control. Still 
reflection is answerable to the experience of humans; philosophical reflection is bound up with the idea 
of metaobjective and metatechnical) experience.   
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A parallel was noted between this point and the inaugural lecture of Heidegger which puts the matter 
thus: What is there left for philosophy when reality is divided up among the various sciences? 
Philosophy must reflect on nothing. (This is an extreme case of pedagogical exasperation.) Nothing is 
what encompasses and holds together the little fields of scientific inquiry; the fields are objective; the 
meta-objective concerns reflect on their foundations and coherence.   
“I believe in order to understand” seems scandalous when we think of belief as an instrument as we 
normally do. We must avoid such an approach to belief, which is exemplified in Paschal’s wager. We 
must remember, however, that Paschal also understands and urges the difference between the God of 
the philosophers (whose existence benefits can be calculated) and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 
(who speaks to us in unforethinkable ways).   
Anselm in his ontological argument was ambivalent between the two concepts of God. Gaunilon forced 
him to resolve the ambiguity, and Anselm did so in favor of interpretation of his argument as cogent, 
aiming at the God of the philosophers.   
Monday, September 29   
There is a difference between “believing in . . . “ and “believing that . . . “ What follows “believing that” 
is a clause representing a state of affairs; states of affairs are scientifically explainable, concrete things 
are not.   
T. Birch wondered if we were not taking “believing that” too lightly, whether the task of philosophy is to 
look at “belief in” to make it “belief that.” According to H. Bugbee “belief that” arises out of “belief in.”   
Albert noted that one has the right to ask about the nature of “belief in.” One unable to articulate 
“belief in” in proposition of the form “belief that” would be guilty of obscurantism. Perhaps believing in 
is just a way of comprehending the infinity of “believes that” all at once. I “believe in” is the original 
founding sense of belief; “believes that” are the pieces, never able to surpass their foundation.   
The entry goes on to say that belief is not our accomplishment but rather we come to be at issue in it. 
This insight is exposed to probing questions which let us feel the force of the closedness and 
misunderstandings we have to reckon with. Such a question might be: “Do you mean it all comes down 
to this?”   
Such questions point up a superficial similarity between relativism or pluralism and Henry’s position. 
Both direct us to the particularity of human lives. The relativist thence proceeds to argue that because 
of the particular variety of human situations there cannot be universal (i.e. invariably present and 
binding) standards, whereas Henry urges that universal (i.e. eminently true for this our world) meaning 
is met only in the individual situation.   
The entry turns to Kant and his root belief in the priceless worth of individual persons, a profession of 
universality. A deficiency in his thought might be a lack of a grasp of individuality and its connection with 
universality.   
On Socrates  
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Thursday, October 2  
The entry recalls that Aristotle attributes to Socrates the inductive method. This way of seeing Socrates 
must be balanced with the way Plato characterized him through his mode of inquiry. The method of 
induction has surely improved, yet there was nothing outdated about Socrates’ method of inquiry. The 
mode of Socratic inquiry is apparent in the principle: “The unexamined life is not worth living.” But what 
about men who work with pick and shovel and whose work has been raised to vocation? This may lead 
us to consider “that the life of a person devoid of genuine vocation is not worth living.” That vocation 
and reflective examination are connected is suggested by Plato’s insights that excellence involved 
knowledge – and that no one knowingly pursues the worse course. But the knowledge here at issue is 
not a knowledge one responds to, a “calling.” Knowledge would be to be equal to the call. Once a 
person is equal to the call that person will not stray from it. The end of the entry reflects on Socrates’ 
death – he was peaceful knowing he was equal to the call.   
Saturday, October 4  
Socrates was claimed to be the wisest of humans; he challenged this claim, yet realized he was the 
wisest man, knowing that he knew nothing. Wisdom is not a knowledge, which can be acquired and 
thought to be a valuable possession. Wisdom is rather a disposition where we are equal to our calling.   
Monday, October 6  
Life should not be understood as a goal at which a person can arrive. In life, everything is always at issue 
in some way. We always stand on a frontier. We don’t peer into the land beyond, making plans, 
however. In this lies the essential equality of all humans, each standing unsurpassably on their frontier.   
 
John Crist 
February 8, 1979 
The book nears the end of the work of 1952. The entries echo the academic work of Henry in an ethics 
course he was teaching.   
He reflects on Socrates’ notion that wisdom is worth little. This in turn leads to a reflection on the nature 
of human equality.   
What is the fundament of equality in our society? The answer to this question is usually brought up in 
terms of rights. It is said that we all have equal rights. In the abstract sense this is true. However a 
distinction must be made between the abstract right and the worth of a right; that is the ability to 
exercise the right. It is obvious that very few of us have the full worth of our rights, because we do not 
have full access to the things that would allow us to use our rights.   
We are unequal.   
1. Born inequalities—size, skill, intelligence.  
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2. Inequalities in our destinies—not being in the right place at the right time, being born 
into a poor family.   
This is a force of reality that is not arbitrary. We do not simply shape the world to our liking. Sartre holds 
that we all start at ground zero and fully shape our lives. But most people remain in the class they were 
born to, those who make it big make it by luck. Yet they are extolled as paradigms which we all could 
follow. This myth of success is often concealed from us, although on occasion our errors do catch up 
with us (shade of Oedipus) and make themselves felt. Often one who succeeds believes she or he is the 
sole author of that person’s greatness, and this is untrue; very much a modern error.   
Kant was persuaded that happiness was not in our control (well-doing did not necessarily lead to well-
being). But he accepted the right to happiness so firmly that he felt the want of happiness in this life to 
be the grounds for the existence of God as there had to be an ultimate reckoning.   
If we are faithful to our deepest aspirations, happiness we achieve is not true happiness. Our deepest 
experiences are those in which we are graced by something greater than ourselves. We experience 
grace, but suffering as well. The experience of the advent of reality whether joyous or painful cannot be 
thought of as either:   
1. our just desserts, or  
2. a mere illusion.  
The advent of reality is a force in itself.   
In modern times we try to disburden ourselves of the force of fate by technology and planning. Prior to 
our modern spirit there was no chance of one being in a position to pull this off. One could only rid 
oneself of fate by withdrawal (Stoics, Epicureans).   
Socrates stated “No harm comes to a good person.” This seems somewhat ambiguous. He must mean 
that we can trust that there is a common root of well-doing and well-being, not that we have some 
immunity by our well-doing.   
Freedom is everyone’s capacity for destiny. There is something unsurpassable in each person’s destiny. 
We cannot tell another what to do. Here is where we are radically equal.   
This can be illustrated by the Old Testament prophets. They felt that it was beyond them to fulfill what 
was called for. Often they even feared for their lives. The callings are not easy and most often humans 
will not be reconciled by a happy ending; rather, by the realization that their lives were meaningful.   
Wednesday, October 8 
We must be forthright in accepting the givenness of a situation and be respectful to that givenness. We 
may conclude that the question of givenness must be begged; so let us be beggars and be equal to the 
givenness of a situation by respecting it in the spirit of prayer. We should accept the givenness of life as 
a gift.   
Friday, October 10 
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Christmas in the wilderness,1944. The ship is charted on the map, but it is secure merely by being so 
charted. The reality is the distance between the Philippines and the islands they had left. This denotes 
the abandonment of men in a situation. The response to the abandonment is a song. Note the similarity 
of the starkness here and that of the swamp. In each case out of the stark simplicity a response arose—a 
song or a celebration on the ship; or the experience of immersion in the swamp.   
Saturday, October 11   
Do not think of well-doing as a warrant against the trials of life. We are reminded of the ambiguity of 
our condition. This ambiguity is not the fickleness of fate, but the ability of ours to be destinate or to fail 
when faced with reality.   
Sunday, October 12  
If self-sufficiency were the ideal of the good life, it seems that it would be reproducible. But our relations 
would be reduced to ones of necessary dependence and independence. If we understand our destiny as 
communal, this will undercut the attempt to follow self-sufficiency as an ideal.   
Wednesday, October 15   
Socrates is talking with Cephalus who is quite old. Socrates inquires into his condition and the old man 
remarks with dignity, engendered from his situation as a man near the end of his life. He shows a 
confidence in the possibility of affirming his life. This is the sort of question that arises in middle age and 
becomes increasingly more urgent. For a young person the past is open for correction, but as our 
horizons close, the past rears its head. We might be tempted to throw this burden off, claiming life to be 
absurd, but Cephalus doesn’t do this. He affirms his life.   
The possibility of affirmation happens in our bearing witness to that which cannot play us false. These 
are the actions of our purest generosity and service (echoes page 10 of the Preface). They are the 
moments of our strength and our ability to help others in simplicity.   
Friday, October 17   
The thought on simplicity leads back to Meister Eckhart. Earth withdraws from heaven and released 
itself to the immovable ground. In doing so it calls forth heaven to embrace it and make it fruitful 
(human-God relationship).   
In the still desert of which Eckhart speaks no one is at home. Similarly John Anderson says that the world 
is unknown. This is not accidental and would not cease to be so after charted. Rather, the world is 
essentially unknown, and to appreciate this is to appreciate its depth. “Our true home is wilderness, 
even the world of every day” (p. 76). Our true home is wilderness and our home is housed in 
wilderness.   
“Love is such a matter of completion of presence from within ourselves” (p. 76). Reality calls for 
completion in and through humans. We tend to emphasize the role of humans as if we are the valuation 
of all things. We are claimed by the creatures, but also by the truth within (Augustine, Book 10). Many 
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people ask us to subordinate ourselves to wilderness. This is to ask too little. Nature calls on humans, 
and we are to complete it through ourselves.   
 
 
 Pat Burke  
February 13, 1979 
Saturday, October, 1959 
We began with the last entry of 1952, Saturday October 18, and its reflections on Cephalus’ statements 
in the Republic. Cephalus seems in these passages to affirm the possibility of looking back over one’s life 
and accepting it as something given in trust. This re-search of one’s life may yield the ground upon 
which one may stand in the present. However, it can only yield this ground, if we understand our 
position with respect to our life as one of trusteeship. If we attempt to command or secure our life we 
violate the terms of this trust. However, the possibility is always open to reaffirm our position as trustee. 
The ground then which we may discover in such a re-collection of our life is not something which we can 
secure as we secure the nature of objects through the application of method in the experimental mode 
of thought. Rather, this ground is discovered through ‘experiential thought’ that responds to things as 
they are given in depth. This ‘experiential thought’ is at the heart of true philosophical enquiry.   
A short summary of what had transpired in the entries of 1952 was then given. It was noted that this 
book is not a composition but rather a record of fidelity to the rhythm of days and works. Its structure is 
analogous to a natural landscape, which while not the result of design or composition, still has its own 
shape and rhythm. Thus The Inward Morning should not be seen as just a stringing together of random 
reflections but as the articulation of a philosophical landscape.   
The year began with intimations of the advent of reality. These were responded to in the abstract mode 
with a discussion of certainty and simplicity, which developed in to reflections on wonder and 
explanation. These themes were succeeded by the sketches of Swamping, Dam Building, and Rowing 
which focused them (and others developed later) in concrete experience. Swamping spoke of the 
immersion in the stark simplicity of reality. The dam building sketch showed an appropriate human 
responding to nature that gathered and founded a natural place. Rowing articulated the experience of 
sport that deepened into a collective enterprise, which gathered the individuals and the world, work and 
joy, into one. The sketches were then followed by abstract elucidations of some of the themes they gave 
rise to.   
The remainder of the year is devoted to an echo of the academic work in Ethics. There are three main 
areas of concern in this work: The nature of ethical enquiry, the significance of Socrates’ life, and the 
connection between well-being and well-doing. These reflections on ethics evidence a calmness and 
confidence that reflects the fact that they are supported by the people and institutions of academia.   
This measured calmness and constraint serves as a contrast to the beginning of the New Year, where the 
guidance and support of the institutional activities are gone. The entry of July 8, 1953 begins with a 
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quote form Claudel expressive of the perplexity and anxiety that is felt by Henry as he attempts to 
engage in experiential thinking and writing, but finds himself becalmed and ‘afloat upon a sea of 
possibilities.’ The passage takes up with the problem of what it is to get in one’s way through anxiety. As 
Marcel points out (The Ego in Relation to Others), in anxiety the ego feels itself thrust into the 
competitive situation because it is unsure of itself and seeks approval and support from others. 
However, the competitive situation is asphyxiating and poisons the atmosphere in which the ego tries to 
work. Anxiety is fundamentally a failure of the ego to come to terms with itself.   
Henry noted that perhaps the situation in which he found himself here attests to that nothingness which 
is essential to the coming to presence of things of which Heidegger speaks in What is Metaphysics. 
Heidegger perhaps also articulated something similar in his exegesis of “Pain has turned the threshold to 
stone” (a line from the poem A Winter Evening by Georg Trakl—discussed in On the Way to Language). 
Perhaps pain as it is used here bespeaks the way in which things work on one so that one is at a loss as 
to the way to proceed.   
In this entry the problem of attempting to engage in experiential though in an unsympathetic 
philosophical climate is addressed. This style of thinking is in a difficult position because it cannot come 
to fruition in an adversary situation. It is not always producible on demand. There are several reasons 
why this is the case. The first and perhaps most critical reason is that our times have in general 
produced very little schooling in this type of thinking. Secondly, there is the difficulty that one feels one 
should resist producing it because it can give rise to a feeling of superiority, which is inimical to the spirit 
of such thought. Finally, experiential thought at its highest has something festive about it which cannot 
be continually produced. Thus experiential thought is always vulnerable to the challenge from the 
accepted mode of philosophy.   
However, when the time is not right for experiential philosophy, one can speak in the abstract mode. 
This abstractness can take two forms. The first is that type of abstract though which is continuous with 
the concrete mode because it is an elucidation of it. Abstract thought can also take the form of 
propaedeutic discourse which delimits the region of essential discourse from without by taking up with 
philosophical positions and showing how they are limited.   
The entry of Thursday, July 8 takes up with the correlative themes of faith and reason in light of the 
guidance provided by the speaking of Meister Eckhart. Eckhart speaks like a reasonable man but one 
whose reasonableness is grounded in faith.   
The proper relationship between faith and reason is the core of the extended recollection of the Indian 
boatman navigating the Rogue River. The river is barely navigable especially during low water but the 
boat provides the essential services of mail and transportation to the residents of the area and therefore 
must continually operate. (It was noted that the U.S. Postal Service today would not use such a boat. It 
would probably either use helicopters or channel the river.) In his navigation of this small boat on the 
river the Indian showed a remarkable communion with the river. This is particularly in evidence when he 
traverses the shallowest spots by allowing the wash of his boat to carry him through. It is a surprising, 
almost artistic maneuver that shows unusual insight into the situation in which he moves. (Henry here 
noted the Taoist sense of things implicit in such a maneuver. By relaxing you are overtaken from behind 
and lifted over what otherwise might shatter you.) It is such apt responses to the exigencies presented 
by the river that bring the river to articulation. The unique responses required by the navigation of the 
boat on the river bring about a fundamental disclosure of the river.   
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It was noted that we have in this account an interesting example of a machine bringing nature to 
articulation. The boat and its engines are congruent with reality. They do not overpower the river and 
cut one off from it. Henry noted the difference between this and his experience on the North Fork of the 
Salmon River, where professional guides are continually roaring up and down the river, oblivious to the 
river and the fishermen along its banks. Albert noted as the complement to this point, that there is a 
concealed danger often not observed with respect to machine technology. Instead of overpowering the 
river with machinery one could imagine the use of a hovercraft or something similar that would be 
completely quiet and unobtrusive. Such a boat would cut us off just as effectively from the river as the 
huge, overpowered boats of the professional guides.   
How then does this recollection of the Rogue River bear upon the relationship between faith and 
reason? Faith is the fundamental familiarity with the river and its hidden rocks. It is the Indian 
boatman’s entrustment of himself to the river and his moving with it. He does not close himself off to 
the situation and try to exercise control over it. Rather, he opens himself to the continuing exigencies 
that are presented by the river. It is only on the foundation of this basic communion with the river that 
he can do what is called for at each particular instant. Thus faith would be our fundamental attunement 
that brings us before reality and liberates us from being lost among things. It is only upon this basis that 
we may be able to speak and act reasonably on any particular occasion.   
Towards the end of the entry Henry says: “I could wish for no more than to do justice to the instruction I 
have received from moving water” (p. 83). This prompted discussion on just what might be the 
instruction of moving water. Albert observed that in a river we have the concrete manifestation of 
rhythm and fluency. Moreover, a river is one of the most momentous and significant features of a 
landscape. It gives the natural landscape its major direction. It gathers the waters from throughout the 
watershed and eventually flows into the sea (an end which seems most appropriate). (The kinship 
between Norman Mclean’s A River Runs Through It and The Inward Morning).   
We then moved to a consideration of Friday, July 10. This entry departs form Picard’s observation that 
natural sounds are the articulations of silence and that if they are not so understood, they degenerate 
into mere noises. Similarly, authentic human speech involves a silence within ourselves that partakes of 
this greater silence. In so far as our speech is not the issue of such silence, it loses its connection with 
reality and becomes mere noise. Meaning can only come out of an inexhaustible ground.   
Henry finds the same point is Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza makes a distinction between three levels of 
knowledge. The first is knowledge of vague and confused ideas. The second is knowledge of clear and 
distinct ideas. Finally, there is the third level of knowledge, which is achieved when we see the clear and 
distinct ideas as expressions of the divine nature. The second level of knowledge corresponds to our 
hearing of sounds as in themselves (abstractly) and not as the issue of silence. Knowledge of clear and 
distinct ideas is knowledge resulting from the representation of distinct things to ourselves and never 
reaches the ground from which all distinct things come forth.   
The third level of knowledge is our concrete understanding of things (not representation) which sees 
them as grounded, not as one thing in another, but as sounds are in silence. Spinoza suggests that this 
concrete understanding of things is only consummated in effective action. Henry concludes the entry by 
reemphasizing this point. “The authenticity of our deeds is the basic condition of our concrete 
understanding of reality” (85). It was noted that with his interpretation of Spinoza, Henry has again 
shown us the living center and perhaps the focal experience of a very abstract philosopher.   
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We then moved to consider the entry of Saturday, July 11. The passage opens with a recollection of 
early morning fishing for steelhead on the Gualala River, when it is alive with fish. Albert pointed out 
that while steelhead have the kinship with the river characteristic of all fish that live in it, they however 
evidence a certain foreignness. Their unusual size, power and numbers speak of the far reaches of the 
river and of the open sea with all its power and fertility. They bring the seas home to one on the river. 
An analogous phenomenon is to be experienced here in Missoula in the summer, when on a hot and 
peaceful day the Clark Fork rushes through the valley. Its rolling waters speak to one of the run-off in the 
mountains which spring has only now reached.   
Albert then offered some reflections, consonant with those of Henry’s in this passage, upon what it 
might mean to fish for and to catch one of these steelhead. It was noted that fishing is a calling up from 
the depths which when successful makes the trout commit itself and stand out in the starkest way. In 
the moment of the catch, the trout is the focus as it leaps from the water – everything is gathered into 
this leaping trout. However, the landscape does not recede, but rather it lights up. In the moment of the 
catch reality is fundamentally disclosed to one. The fog of confusion and ambiguity lifts from the world, 
and the universe arises and comes into relief. As Henry says, “The very trees become eloquent where 
they stand” (87). It is like the lightening of Zeus (Heraclitus) that reveals the world in a flash. It is in this 
way that individuality and universality go hand in hand in experience.   
In this entry we have the counterpart to the immersion in the stark simplicity of reality given in the 
sketch on “Swamping.” Here we have reality in its full color and vitality. In fact the danger of our 
concentration being dissipated in the excitement with the fullness of reality is remarked in the passage. 
There are so many fish that it is difficult to concentrate one’s attention on any particular fish. This 
danger of dispersal calls for a moment of recollection, so that one may “fish in one place, for one fish at 
a time” (86).   
In the image of the leaping trout, this passage gives us the paradigm for what we mean when we speak 
of appearance, advent, or emergence. When we use such words we hearken back to a primal coming 
forth like that of the leaping trout. The birth of the individual in concrete experience, which through its 
gathering power simultaneously discloses the universal, gives us the true sense of individuality and 
universality. The entry concludes by observing that the typological construal of these terms, such as we 
have in Aristotle’s Categories is a decayed and abstract version of their meaning as it is given to us 
concretely in experience.   
 
Jim Maher 
February 15, 1979 
Saturday, July 11, 1953 
We can begin with the conclusion of the entry of Saturday, July 11. There is a decay facing and 
threatening philosophy and all of us when we move from great experiences to everyday life. We have all 
had experiences in which reality is brought into focus, e.g., the leaping trout. This can be an experience 
of nature, art, companionship, solitude, etc. The danger is that we are often not true to these great 
experiences in our everyday life. Fidelity can decay, and when this happens the great experiences decay 
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into idyllic episodes. Dr. Bugbee commented that there is a need to clear ourselves of what has spoken 
in us. Dr. Borgmann stated that our faint-heatedness in speaking on behalf of great experiences is the 
result of a misinterpretation of our own self-importance. We need to remember that we are not the 
warrant for great things or experiences. One speaks up on behalf of something great.   
 
Sunday, July 12   
Dr. Bugbee begins the entry by reflecting that he is his own chief obstacle. This is not just any obstacle, 
but a crucial one. This perception is spoken of with pain. It leads to reflections on self-centeredness as 
being closed to truth. There is an intentional obscurity in self-deception. One’s self-image is kept in 
obscurity. This obscurity works its way out in concrete life as a floating alibi. This may take the form of “I 
am the great . . . “. One may claim to be a great poet or a great musician and be willing to shift 
categories and make different claims of greatness if there is a chance that one will be discovered in his 
delusion. This sort of existence can be seen in The Secret Life of Walter Mitty. Dr. Bugbee stated that 
self-deception is a danger inherent to those who engage in reflection. In reflection we seek our place in 
the world. There is often a shift from seeking one’s self and one’s place to pretenses about the self. We 
seem afraid to really discover the place that we seek. There is a social counterpart this. Our social 
conception of ourselves is often not what we are, but what we want to be. Modern society wants to be 
judged by the means which it gives to its members for their free time. This allows people to escape 
ultimate judgement.   
Marcel said that the ego is often used as a means. If one succeeds and gains approval, one can take both 
of these results as signs of one’s own superiority. In this way his self-deception continues unabated. 
Marcel also suggests a way out of this predicament. We should accept that the best part of our 
personality is given to us. We awaken to this in an attitude of “availability.” We need to become 
available to this gift.   
The concrete epistemological import of these reflections is that we must open ourselves in all manner of 
situations and trust in the great simplicities of life. The entry moves from the experience of pain to 
simplicity experienced in gratitude. In “The Thinker as Poet,” in Poetry, Language, Thought,  Heidegger 
moves in a different progression – from the splendor of the simple to the healing of pain.   
Monday, July 13  
The discussion began with reflections on the Chinese poem in the entry. In two strokes the poem gives 
us a landscape. There is an economy and wonderful matter-of-factness in brush paintings. Fulfillment is 
not a result of being swept off one’s feet. It is to be filled with the matter-of-factness of things. Dr. 
Bugbee pointed out an objection to the necessary/contingent argument for the proof of the existence of 
God. If something exists eminently, then it is necessary. Things cannot be other than they are. This is 
made clear by Spinoza. The poem by Donald William does not bring forth the sense of the real as the 
Chinese poem does. A subject/object split is suggested in William’s poem.   
The discussion then turned to Hume on subjectivity and objectivity. There is a distorting interplay of 
internality and externality in Hume. Hume wants to determine what external reality is and then asks 
what internal reality is capable of. He withdraws into the subject to see what kind of external knowledge 
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is possible. Reality becomes impressions and ideas. The presence of ideas is not by itself the presence of 
reality. Causality is discovered to give connectedness to reality but cannot itself be discovered as a 
necessary reality. Causality is seen to be mere custom or habit. Custom and habit may be the buried-
over fundament of what The Inward Morning calls faith, i.e. the basis on which reality is experienced.  
Reason is fickle and cannot be entrusted with causality. Custom and habit have something stable about 
them which reasons lacks and for this reason can be entrusted with causality.    
Dr. Borgmann commented that the breaking of bread is the central thing brought forcefully to one’s 
attention in the New Testament. Christ points to the consistency of all that has gone on before on the 
road to Emmaus. But the disciples fail to accept it until they see Jesus in the breaking of bread. In early 
Christianity the breaking of bread holds the community together. It is not an accident that bread and 
wine are central to the New Testament. Christianity and nature come to the fore in the entry’s 
reflections on the simple. Nature and Christianity do not need to be brought together since they are 
intimately connected at the center.   
The discussion then turned to the relation of The Inward Morning to empiricism and idealism. The book 
never meets empiricism “head on.” It takes empiricism and deepens it. It takes seriously the injunction 
“Be reasonable.” Its response is not one of eccentricity. What enables us to be real is found in faith. The 
book should be located on the side of a deepened empiricism. The Inward Morning is a book at home in 
this country in trying to find its own way in dialogue with established philosophy. Idealists have always 
been viewed as exotics in this country, and the book is at home in this country in that it does not 
attempt to transcend established philosophy as idealism would. Descartes was an idealist in that the 
obtainable truths are all there in person. Experience is an incidental way in which we acquire the truths 
we are assured of. Empiricists also accepted that the truth could be had in an assured way, but the 
emphasis was different. The attempt to amalgamate empiricism and rationalism can take two tasks: The 
first is to design a system. To be a great reconciler of philosophical systems is largely a waste of time. 
The second way is to ask why we philosophize in the first place. We philosophize to be true to our 
greatest experiences and to make room for them. We need to ask how empiricism and rationalism 
influence the climate of our world such that our experiences deepen or wither away. Empiricism (the 
givenness of things) can turn into data analysis or gratitude for the gift of life. Rationalism can also be 
viewed in similar ways. It is important to see that it is a matter of utter indifference whether or not we 
can reconcile empiricism and rationalism, and we deceive ourselves in seeing this as important. Once 
one has a grounding in great experiences, one can be oriented towards these debates in a resourceful 
way. The session was concluded with the observation that the U.S. is a great country without great 
philosophy.   
 
Dave Strong 
February 20, 1979 
Today we began a new approach to the journal because we are running out of time. So that we do not 
lose the continuity or thread of thought running through the entries, the first hour entailed giving a 
quick summary of each entry. I incorporate the later discussions of some of the entries together with the 
shorter summaries.   
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Tuesday, July 14 
The major theme departs from Descartes’ doubt and caution. Descartes cannot disavow a trustingness 
in reality upon which his doubt relies. However, a philosopher’s trustingness in the reflective task does 
not allow the philosopher to conceive reality as consisting “only of the extension and further 
organization of our knowledge about it.” In philosophy there is no progress, rather “our position is less 
akin to knowers and more akin to that of testifiers, witnesses.” We lose this character pf philosophy 
when we fall into misleading distinctions such as within and outside the mind. Sure, the object is outside 
me, but only as I am outside the object in the same way, and this is unilluminating. These misleading 
distinctions all yield ghosts: “disembodied knowers, trying to know their way into a hypothetical world,” 
and then the ghostly world of phenomenalism. Henry said that with the disembodied knowers he was 
alluding to the chapter “The Ghost in the Machine” in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind.   
 Wednesday, July 15  
The matter of testimony is continued in this entry. Kant, rather than being a mediator between 
Rationalism and Empiricism, is more fundamentally opposed to both because of their reportorial 
attitude. Albert agreed that this may have been closest to Kant’s heart, but the interpretation of Kant 
which has been most historically consequential sees in Kant an effort to secure thee conditions for the 
possibility of whatever might be. There is something reductive, impoverishing, and possessive of reality 
in this aspect of Kant.   
The central theme for the next entry appears at the end of this one: A philosopher cannot leave himself 
and “his mode of involvement in reality out of account.”   
Friday, July 17 
All speaking and theorizing is enworlded. Any and all speaking bespeaks a world. What is explicit in 
theorizing depends upon implicit being in the world. If one’s implicit world is denied, one’s explicit 
theorizing falls apart. But the implicit is something shy and vulnerable; it cannot come to the fore in 
adversary discourse.   
Saturday, July 18  
This entry shows forcefully how the flows of water and life are one. This unity allows us to explicate the 
relationship between reasonableness and faith.   
Sunday, July 19 
In C.I. Lewis’s work reality is denatured in abstract thought. This abstraction can be overcome through 
critical spade work, that is, paying close attention to the work of a someone like Lewis. This critical work 
may sleep in us for a time before bearing more concrete fruit with regard to the themes that genuinely 
concern us.   
The account of the drive into Mexico is the counterpart to this critical spade work. Here the style is 
exploratory and tentative: a most sensitive extending oneself into reality. Things are grounded in being, 
a no-thing, a no-where. This no-thing is not a principle from which things are derived or produced, 
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rather it is a ground that frees them for what they are. Things are eternal in that they are eminently 
timely; not that they are timeless.  
Later John Crist asked to have this account explicated further. This entry is most striking not for what it 
says but for its highly exploratory character. It strains to be sensitive, to follow an insight on the edge of 
reflective life, whereas most of the entries have undergone a kind of filtration. This exploratory strength 
brings with it its weakness – it can mislead by misspeaking some things. For example, we should not be 
led to believe that there is an a priori character to knowing things even before they are encountered. 
Things are born, emerge, come forth and our expectation is a letting them come forth as they are. In 
expectation we let things in their intrinsic importance stand out; we do not derive their importance.   
In connection with this account, Henry suggested reading the entry on bells, Monday, November 2, 
1953.   
Monday, July 20 
The theme of reflection here is the overcoming of the spirit of abstraction. Abstraction is fostered when 
we concentrate upon the “aboutness” of thinking and aspiring, and are forgetful of the “fromness” of 
our thinking. Only when we take into account the “fromness” of our thinking can we appreciate both the 
individual and universal as necessary. This appreciation is exemplified in the Greek notions of 
harmonious order, simplicity and necessity.   
Tuesday, July 21 
Understanding reality is not a systematic canvassing of all finite things. Nor are things derived from 
something else which is some thing. So when we think of the bond that holds everything together as “in 
another,” the scholastic esse in alio, we are not to think of it as some other thing. This central decisive 
thought, that “there is more to reality than meets the mind’s eye,” is nourished by moments of 
involuntary recall. It’s an important point that “the meaning of past experiences emerges as if having 
undergone filtration.” In involuntary recall, meaning becomes like pure spring water – cleansed and 
clarified. From this “one gains his bearings and stance as a human being.”   
This discussion leads to the question of how things are centered which is the simple and difficult point of 
the book, “the importance of things is indeed intrinsic to them.” The dignity of things does not dissolve 
but opens up the question as to how a person is cognitive of the importance of things. The meaning of 
things, “the existence of things, the standing out of the distinct, can only make sense, as we stand forth 
ourselves, as we are made to stand forth.” The existence of things only comes home to us as we are 
equal to them in existing ourselves.   
Later we discussed this point more. Henry pointed out that he chose “intrinsic” in contrast to 
“inherent.” “Inherent” has the connotation of there being a simple, unanalyzable property of things 
which inheres. The intuitionist philosophers, e.g. , G.E. Moore and W.D.  Ross, often talk about these 
inherent non-natural properties such as the properties of good or right. But, Henry points out, there is 
no such thing as “objective values.” So the intrinsic importance of things must not be thought of as a 
property of them.   
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Albert pointed out an important consequence which follows from this distinction. When the intrinsic 
importance of something, say a river, overtakes us and we are equal to it, we know that it cannot play us 
false. It enters into all our relations with the world and we can put I to the test. Then the question arises: 
how can a scientific description of the river be related to our experience? A scientific account, 
employing the principles of physics and chemistry, is very tight, detailed and forceful. It leaves no gaps 
for anything else; the river is all molecules, atoms, and their properties. Well then, what has happened 
to the value of the river? If one adheres to a doctrine of inherent values one is brought up short; they 
either must deny the scientific account or say the value-properties are properties which science cannot 
discover. However if one takes the importance of things to be intrinsic then finding no gaps in the 
scientific account is not bothersome. To ask, “Is there nothing more to the river?,” shows faintness of 
heart, a failure to be true to the river. What the questioner wants here is a warrant for saying the river 
has value. Allowing for this scientific account shows how the The Inward Morning allows for the 
convergence of very different modes of thought.   
In this connection Henry brought up the story of Saint-Exupery’s plane crash from Wind, Sand, and Stars. 
After struggling to find help in the desert, he finally ran out of strength and waited to die. Then he began 
to think of water and thought he did justice to it for the first time in his life. Here something as humble 
as water registered with authoritative power. Rather than just “a knowing” of it, he acknowledged the 
power and significance of it. Then, too, for the first time, “I discovered I was friend to myself, and had no 
enemies.”  
This led to a discussion of the spirit of renunciation, partly because Saint-Exupery exemplified it here. It 
was noted that in this entry Meister Eckhart is quoted as saying that we have only to be empty to be 
filled. Before renunciation, one is set upon accomplishing goals and has a full purview of matters at 
hand. But things start getting out of hand until one realizes there is no more one can do. Then one 
relaxes and accepts the situation. Henry alluded to To Build a Fire, and the Buddhist saying, “Living each 
day as if one were dead.” Albert noted that in this time more than ever we need disciplined renunciation 
because we are always full but never filled. We are only half sick to our stomachs.    
Henry said that renunciation can appear in almost the opposite form. Alcibiades in the Symposium says 
Socrates can eat or not eat, drink or not drink. Suzuki in the Essence of Buddhism says, “When hungry I 
eat. When tired I sleep.” A person living in this spirit lives like one in primordial naturalness; only the 
person is self-conscious of what sustains the person.   
Thursday, July 23 
The same theme of humans’ actions bound up with their understanding and appreciation of reality is 
taken up. Life and philosophy are not independent of one another. If one tries to suppress the center of 
one’s life in the philosophy one writes then it is revealed and bespoken rather than spoken about. J.S. 
Mill in his philosophy makes the principle of utility fundamental and any fellow-feeling merely 
derivative, yet in his writings he discloses a deep affection for his fellow human beings. This is what Mill 
should acknowledge as really fundamental in his thought. J. Rawls likewise has a split between his 
theory and his heart.   
Because life and philosophy are not independent, philosophical reflection cannot depend beyond the 
depth of our actions. We should not think one needs to act greatly and live adventurously in order to 
think greatly and adventurously. Kant and Descartes led quiet lives.   
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Friday, July 24 
This entry begins with a note which reflects on the subliminal feeling in humans of the need for rain. The 
weather teaches us we are one even with plants. We both feel a relief and a rejoicing. In conjunction 
with the preceding entry it was noted that this is the kind of activity and sensitivity which is fruitful for 
philosophy, not necessarily great deeds. In everyone’s time the endurance of pain and disappointments 
can be great in a sense.   
Henry said Conrad’s Lord Jim is a good example and exploration of the tension of one who feels himself 
called to do great deeds and yet does not think everyday existence counts.   
Tom Birch suggested that only out of a background of experiencing great risks can we appreciate the 
gentle teachings of the weather.   
Albert disagreed saying that in pretechnological times people were called to do great things and their 
actions enhanced the dignity of a person, but now deeds such as skiing down Everest or ballooning 
across the Atlantic are uncalled for, foolish, and do not enhance anyone’s dignity. What is called for 
today is fidelity to tasks: to do it even if it could be escaped.   
The entry moves to reflect upon the control of belief and attitude. The later Stoic Epictetus claims to 
have a technique for controlling belief and attitude. He sees that our caring attitude makes us 
vulnerable. Thus the caring attitude must be secured or it will undermine our efforts to keep reality at 
bay. But a concealment is revealed. Who am I when assuming a position of control? Where does the 
desire for control come from? Any attitude, even one where I assume control, can be shown to rest on 
some ground, be it firm or flimsy.   
We are oriented towards things from the footing we have in being grounded. And our discovery and 
understanding of that ground is a matter of feeling.   
Saturday, July 25 
The clear, fresh day and Beethoven’s Opus 135 make the author realize “that the readiness to receive is 
all.” No gift can be given without a receiving. Receiving comes about in contemplation. Contemplation 
takes two forms:   
1. perceptive or aesthetic (which are etymologically the same),   
2. meditative, reflective or philosophic.   
The two are closely related to the concrete and abstract modes of thought respectively.   
The relationship seen between art and philosophy is very close to Heidegger’s understanding and is very 
different from the usual view today. The issue of the practical importance of art is ignored in much of 
philosophy and aesthetics. In this entry it is held that art and philosophy are practical in that “they are 
kindred ways in which reality nurtures in us the soul of generosity” from which we are enabled to act.   
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In contemplation we learn of the sustaining ground in which we are rooted. How we are rooted in reality 
is a deep and dark question. We do not learn this by uprooting ourselves; trying to make such an 
inspection would destroy what we are interested in. An understanding of the ground is often 
inconspicuous. It sometimes occurs in sleep, “as when sleep restores us to simplicity.”   
In sleeping, dreaming, and memory we have a profound contact with reality. We all share in the 
experience of sleep and it is from these kinds of experiences that philosophers should draw their 
reflections. It was said that to lose the sanctity of sleep is to lose a great part of human existence. And a 
life that in the evening does not restore us to sleep and simplicity cannot be a good life. How these 
experiences are translated into a physiology of sleep and memory are secondary though interesting 
problems; the person of science who investigates these areas must either be informed by philosophy or 
have a philosophic sense if the person’s investigations are not to be aimless and the conclusions 
ludicrous.   
 
Greg Barringer 
February 22, 1979 
Sunday, July 26  
This entry opens with the questions: “What may it mean not to have lived in vain? How is it possible to 
accept dying?” (p. 114). In any attempt to approach these questions, we are warned, rather advised, “. . 
. not suppose a case, but take the case that is . . . “ (p . 114). Death confronts us as a case that is.   
Aristotle asks: What is good for a human being? Bugbee says the more basic question is: what is a 
human being good for? The notion is what is fitting for a human to do – what is nonvain. Here, again, we 
are faced with the notion of vocation. (The Latin verb is vocare: to call. The noun, vocatio: the calling).  
Monday, July 27 
In this entry we are told that we must be open to experience speaking in the imperative. That is, we 
must be open to the instructions of things loved. We must ‘be ready’ to respond. This response, as we 
were told earlier, in “decision.” Decision is distinguished from insistence in that the former is affirmative 
in character, while the latter is assertive.    
Also in this entry is a passage from Faulkner’s Old Man. In it, we are told, can be seen the convict’s move 
from insistence to decision.   
Tuesday, July 28  
What is sought for in this entry is a distinction – an affirmative “want” and an assertive “want” – a 
distinction which is lacking in Kant’s ethical thought.   
The author also points out that the Stoics, and the Epicureans, had the acute insight that it is our 
attitude of caring that gets us into trouble – yet they fail to recognize that it is this same attitude that 
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gets us out of trouble. The notion for these thinkers was that attitudes are to be over-ridden – 
controlled.   
The entry is a critique of this insistence. It closes with the image of the swimmer swimming with even 
strokes, weathering both the crests and the troughs with assurance.   
 
 
Wednesday, July 29  
The critique here is of those who take the undulations of the “sea” of attitudes at face value. These are 
the ones who would say that the crests, the ups, are to be strived for while the troughs, the downs, are 
to be avoided. The author, in this criticism, bespeaks a notion of purity of attitude, of being sustained 
equally by the troughs and the crests.   
Thursday, July 30 
The entry opens with an expression of doubt. The doubt springs from the fact that there is no firm, 
objective, grasp of experience. The complaint is that the preceding entries have been too assertive. The 
author quotes Marcel, who also warns of the danger of the “ringing hollow” of “existential philosophy,” 
due to the elusive character of experience. The author goes on to say that he would rather say 
“experiential” than “existential” philosophy – but adds that his notion of experience is different than 
that of the empiricists (cf. p. 125).   
The question then becomes whether it is possible to have faith in humans while being faithless with 
respect to Reality. The answer given is that faith in humans is possible only if there is faith in Reality. The 
notion is that humans and Reality are inseparable, humans are part of Reality, humans are 
fundamentally conversant with Reality. This is contrasted with Sartre for whom the things of Reality are 
inane, absurd.   
Friday, July 31 
Again, we have more reflections on Sartre. Firstly, it is noted that “involvement” or “engagement” is a 
central theme in Sartre’s thought. Bugbee’s claim is that Sartre’s notion of “involvement” is asleep in 
respect to what “involvement” means. The problem is that Sartre has no counterpart for the 
involvement. Things, as stated above, are inane – and other persons appear as threats to each other’s 
integrity. The force of this seems to be estrangement, not involvement.   
 Secondly, the author reflects on Sartre’s notion of action. For Sartre, freedom resides in choice, which is 
met with the assumption of autonomy, the making of ourselves by ourselves. The problem arises in 
connection with necessity of action. Bugbee’s claim is that though Sartre rejects Formalism (“. . . the 
placing of the necessity of action in formulated rules of action . . . ,“ p. 127) he seems to have no other 
choice.   
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Lastly, Sartre locates “bad faith” in humanity. He shows what it is to lack good faith, or just faith. 
Bugbee’s point is that this admitted lack should be a “. . . threshold that opens out into the wilderness 
that is the reality of faith” (p. 128). The entry closes with recollections of the centrality of the wilderness 
theme.   
Saturday, August 1  
Opening the entry are remarks on Cezanne’s “Rock Landscape.” “The painting seems a paradigm of 
things truly perceived” (p. 129). The painting is an expression of the lived significance of things – it is not 
a photographic reproduction. It teaches respect and love of things. Yet, neither truly perceived things 
nor the intelligible response to things can be pocketed by the mind. “Only as we may be ripe for it in our 
entirety does it seem that reality may dawn on us concretely and anew” (p. 129). What is involved is 
“seeing with the eye of faith,” an intimacy with things.   
Tuesday, August 4 
This entry opens with a “phrase in the manner of Emerson: there is somewhat absolute in our 
experience” (p. 131). Noted here is the ephemeral condition of humans – the understanding of 
experience comes and goes, waxes and wanes. As Pindar notes, we are called upon daily anew. Also 
noted in class was the connection between the ephemeral condition of humans and the form of this 
book as a journal, complete with its good and bad days, and the flowing from day to day.  Panta rhei. 
 
John Wagner  
March 1, 1979 
Class began noting Henry’s doctoral dissertation – The Sense and Conception of Being as being indicative 
of the emergence of the kind of thought found in The Inward Morning, the latter bringing themes of the 
dissertation to clarity and maturity.   
We first turned to the theme of necessity in the entry of Sunday, August 16 as it seems to emerge from 
the discussion on Hume, Spinoza, and Kant. These thinkers act as a sounding board for the reflections 
and discussion to ensue. It is an attempt to dig beneath their arguments to find a positive notion of 
necessity that is initially circumscribed. Their thought presents us with a difficulty to be confronted, 
wherein we might find out own notion of necessity buried. “All judging as activity implicitly presupposes 
the category of necessity, and it is the standpoint of an active being for whom de jure claims have 
fundamental force.” The question posed is: Can necessity have relevance in so far as we abstract from 
such a standpoint? No, necessity is found in the experience of critical situations, the force of necessity to 
respond is found in one piece: it must be an experiential category and “has no proper place in thinking 
abstractly about the course of events.”  
In Spinoza we find this notion confirmed. Necessity springs from the indwelling cause of things to which 
we respond from within ourselves. Spinoza says: “Is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all 
things?” Henry asks: Must we not discover the “indwelling” from within ourselves?   
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Hume takes the position of an observer, hence necessity evaporates. What enters decisively into the 
connection of events is to be realized and not merely observed. Henry feels necessary connection is to 
realize what happens and what must happen. Henry feels that the force that does survive in Hume’s 
causality is not admitted into ethical considerations.   
Tuesday, August 18 
The entry acknowledges that Kant puts the greatest stress on active nonarbitrariness. That 
imperativeness, Henry feels, bespeaks “unconditional concern.” An interlude in the entry shows that our 
concern must be all-encompassing; if confined to the ethical its real force is denied. The entry serves to 
recover the scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals, everything that is, is true, beautiful, and good. To 
experience things as beautiful is clearly a matter of experiential tutelage in unconditional concern. The 
transcendentals are so called because the good, true, and beautiful transcend the limits of the 
categories.   
The entry argues that the unconditional concern in the beautiful rescues art from the innocuous and 
opens it to the vein of gratitude. Similarly, the ethical import of unconditional concern may restore us to 
the appreciation of a commitment in which truth is at stake. Heidegger preserves truth in this vein, 
reserving “truth” for eminent or decisive truth while conventional truth he calls “correctness.” We can 
correspondingly distinguish between this relation in the notion of “declarative assent” and “active 
assent,” the willingness to put oneself out. The problem is to show that there is a gradation between the 
two; that there in a fact-value split.   
Wednesday, August 19 
The entry returns to reflections on Kant. It is felt, to return to moral judgement, that Kant tacitly appeals 
to experience in grounding moral judgment. Finality and necessity are experiential ideas and therefore 
must be grounded in experience.   
Necessity may be said to be responded to in “active assent.” If a cogent procedure for obtaining assent 
could be set forth, only “declarative assent” could be exacted, which is not capable of the discovery of 
finality and necessity.  
The root difficulty for Kant is to elucidate the categorical imperative and formulate a procedure in which 
it may be established. Kant tries to distill such a procedure. But the examples Kant gives in his reflections 
fall short of the dignity the matter requires. The true response to the categorical imperative lies in active 
assent, which is lost in following this procedural approach.   
Friday, August 21 - Saturday, August 29 
In the entries of the 21st and 27th, we find reflections on abstract and concrete discourse or 
experiences vs. characteristics (values). The 21st also speaks of the subtle idolatry, which is the gravest 
danger that the type of discourse found in The Inward Morning faces, not a danger from without (like 
skeptical colleagues) but from within.   
The entry of August 22nd deals with the notion of religion as unsatisfiable hunger, counter-posing to this 
the notion of simplicity found in the entry of the 29th.   
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Friday, August 21 
On subtle idolatry: The first part is devoted to and makes the point that things in their givenness call for 
respect. To specify conditions of respect in terms of personality severed from the presence of the 
givenness of things is mistaken. This understanding of “personality” leads to the idolatry of the self. 
Naturalism seems to escape idolatry by reducing the finite to the objective. Idealism subordinates the 
finite to the infinite. Once the World is impoverished in either of these two ways, the self becomes 
idolized. The result is sometimes a clutching of one by the other in search of meaning, as when one says: 
“I’ll find my fulfillment in her.” Humanity becomes abstracted from the world. The foreshortening of a 
thing to an object goes along with the idolatry of the self. Note this in relation to insistence as opposed 
to decision. Henry recalled the fishing experience where the “fishermen” watched a woman with “a 
pole” catch a ten pounder which “gave her the nod.”   
Sunday, August 23 -Tuesday, August 25   
Here we find the theme of darkness and density, or the otherness of things.   
Friday, August 28 
A discussion on the theme of science and the fullness of experience.  
 
Pat Burke: 
March 8, 1979  
Saturday, September 5 – Monday, October 5  
The journal entries concerning life at sea were again the point of departure for the meeting. What 
strikes one most forcefully about these entries is the gift of life at sea which claims a man. (In contrast, 
there are few if any occasions today in which a claim of this sort is encountered.) The most striking case 
of such a claim of the life at sea is given in the entry of Saturday, September 5, which describes the 
experience of being called upon at night to steer a course in a difficult sea. The starkness of the claim of 
reality in “Swamping” is here heightened to a level of crazed enormity. In “Swamping” the awareness of 
the swamp gives way to the gladness of being in it. Similarly, in this entry, the inane enormity of the 
demands of life aboard the ship overtakes one and gets one out of this withholding and eventually 
beyond enduring to a position of continual adequation with the occurrent.   
Henry, at this point, related to us his experience of putting to sea in a severe typhoon. The war was over 
and his ship had put into port in order to tear down one of its engines. The typhoon came upon them 
with little warning. The first indication they had of being in its path, was the bottom falling out of their 
barometer. Upon radioing headquarters, they were informed that every commanding officer was 
responsible for his own ship. Heeding Melville’s warning that the real peril for a seafarer is the land, they 
put to sea with one engine out in an attempt to gain protection from the storm on the lee side of the 
island. However, by the time they were under way, the typhoon was upon them. There seemed to be no 
way out and no way which one could rely upon. The initial difficulty of making it through a 300 yard 
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wide channel in the barrier reef at the mouth of the harbor seemed insurmountable. They could neither 
take the waves dead ahead nor dead astern because the rudder and propellers would come out of the 
water and they would lose what little control they still had. All that they were able to do was to take 
each wave as it came and responding as best they could to it. After this storm, Henry said, the crew had 
the same look of innocence about them that was in the eyes of the young man who nearly drowned in 
the river. They had been washed clean by their total involvement with the storm.   
Tom asked how the calm that descended upon the crew might be related to the notion of disinterested 
interest. Henry responded, that in such a situation as that encountered in the typhoon, one is 
empowered for a time so that one is not in bondage to his interest for survival: This empowerment is 
not a calling upon one’s own resources but rather it seems that what is overpowering sponsors one and 
enables such action as it is necessary to take.   
Albert asked us to consider the experience of serious illness or decease of a loved one and how such an 
experience provides intimations of what we are discussing here. In the illness of a child, for example, we 
have to act but we often feel anger or resentment over this unavoidable claim on us. However, if such a 
situation stretches us to the limits of our capability and breaks our resentment,  we grow and can come 
to experience gratefully such greatness as we have been empowered to attain. There is of course the 
danger that our resentment will not be broken and that we will insist on our private rights. If such a 
position is maintained, we come to shape our lives in such a way that these challenges are either 
removed or are taken up by a technology that disburdens us of the task of being equal to them.   
Henry noted here that there is an important difference between the crisis of illness and the challenges 
faced in the situation aboard ship. With the ship there was always something to tend; something that 
kept them occupied. The ritual of such tending to the ship lightened the burden of the overwhelming 
challenges they faced. Henry recollected one experience, however, that was similar to the crisis of 
illness. Their ship was anchored in a peaceful and supposedly safe harbor, when unexpectedly they were 
attacked by a suicide plane. They had no time to get underway and they had to just sit there as the 
plane came at them. Those who were manning the guns and firing at the plane were the lucky ones. 
However, those of the crew, like Henry, who could only watch and experience a strange sense of 
removal from the situation. As a result of this one man broke and attempted to jump overboard.   
Albert noted that in the case of illness there is perhaps something that can be done. One can be with the 
person, and this is a kind of activity. Henry agreed and recalled the episode in Herzog’s book Annapurna 
where Herzog is receiving excruciatingly painful injections in an attempt to restore his circulation after 
suffering severe frostbite. Herzog says that his climbing companion who held him during these injections 
was the only thing that made it possible for him to suffer the pain. (Henry also noted that Cavell’s essays 
in Must We Mean What We Say on King Lear are relevant to what it means to be with another.)  
Tom then brought up the question of whether there is a technological tendency today which tries to 
disburden us of the situations in which we can do nothing. And if there is, when and to what extent is 
such disburdenment legitimate. Henry noted that in the typhoon they would have been delighted to 
have had radar. However, the danger is that our reliance on technology will lock us into the attempt to 
always ward off things and that as a result we will become more and more dependent on such 
technologies that allow us to cope. In Jack London’s To Build a Fire, it is only after the man realizes that 
he cannot build a fire and that he is surely going to die, that he is relieved of the mortality that makes 
him prisoner. Similarly, in so far as we come to always rely on technologies which allow us to overcome 
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the situation in which we are placed, we can never pass from interestedness to what might be the 
experiential heart of the notion of disinterested interest.   
Albert remarked that in general the technological reaction to a challenge is to attempt to overcome it 
and hence not to respond to it as it presents itself to us. This reaction is, however, often appropriate, 
e.g., the application of technology in medicine. The real danger is in the tendency to universalize the 
technological approach and extend it to challenges which should not be taken up in this way. This is a 
radically new difficulty for human beings and calls for a profoundly different kind of courage if we are to 
face it. It is not the pretechnological courage that is required when we face adversity. Rather, the 
courage required of the technological person is the courage to be equal to one’s experiences of 
simplicity.   
The entry of Wednesday, September 16 speaks of such an experience of simplicity and intimates how it 
may center our lives. However, the experience of simplicity as it is embodied in the birds’ song in this 
entry is endangered on all sides. The courage to be equal to such experiences must beware of at least 
two ever-present dangers. The first is that of ideology, whose promises are greater than those which can 
be made on behalf of simplicity, but which are ultimately empty. The appeal of ideology can make us 
forget that the highest authenticity we can attain to is that of being alive to the birds’ song. Henry noted 
here that it is characteristic of liberal thought to be totally concerned with the ideal conditions pertinent 
to human fulfillment. This concern however leaves the world out of account and concentrates on 
persons in abstraction from the address and response situation. It, therefore, fails to see that a person 
does not originate this address. The fulfillment of the person as agent only comes about in response to 
things as they address us. The appeal of ideology can easily make us forget where, in fact, we already 
are and consequently also make us forget the question of how we might come to dwell there more fully. 
(Albert noted the relevance of the present situation at the university to what we were discussing. The 
claims of the schools of Business, Pharmacy and Forestry are taken as self-evidently justified: No one, 
however, addresses the issue of what happens when all of the forests are properly managed, all the pills 
correctly dispensed, etc. The claims of the Fine Arts would acquire greater force if one were to address 
this issue.)  
The other danger to the courage of simplicity is the distraction which dissipates rather than overwhelms 
our courage. In the western world it is technology which preeminently provides this distraction. In 
addition to dissipating the courage of simplicity, this distraction can, also, veil the emptiness of 
ideological promises and make us more susceptible to them.   
Beginning with the entry of Sunday, September 16, The Inward Morning is devoted to recollections of 
several of the shipmates on YMS 319. The entries first speak of the ship in general as one of hope and 
innocence, and then move to recollections of specific shipmates in their defining moments, where they 
act in accord with their character. The first of these shipmates is Chief Johnson who is given to us in two 
complementary defining moments. The first is when he is firing into a plane during an attack upon the 
ship. Although Johnson is no gunner (He is a bad shot and ruins the rifling of the gun by firing a whole 
drum of ammunition without a pause), he gathers everyone aboard into a great moment of accord and 
effort in his firing into the plane. (The parallel to John Schultz in “Rowing” was noted). This moment of 
engagement with the plane is disclosive of Johnson’s “wholeheartedness,” his being “where he was and 
not in the least degree anywhere else.” (189) (It was noted that this episode is not meant to convey the 
impression that combat is the model of engagement. In fact, in this passage Henry concludes by saying 
that “At that moment I saw beyond the war.” (189). The complementary recollection of Chief Johnson is 
that of him presiding at the long table in the galley without any airs whatsoever, his being just there. 
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And in this inconspicuous being just there, he is again a gathering presence as he was when he fired into 
the plane. Johnson focused the ship by the way in which he was peculiarly one with himself and with his 
world.   
Henry remarked at this point that the YMS 319 was principally involved in seafaring and not in 
aggressive combat. Their primary duty was to remove navigational obstacles (mines) and to fend off 
attacks on vessels they were escorting. It was thus principally in the tending of the ship, in seafaring, 
that the crew came together. The ship was truly a “thing” for them in Heidegger’s sense. It focused and 
brought to a center the lives of the shipmates. It gathered a world.   
The next sketch was of Chief Machinist Mate Hill, who tended the engines of the ship under unfavorable 
and trying conditions. He overcame these obstacles through his fidelity to his task and drew others into 
his concern for the continuous operation of the ship. His success in transferring his fidelity and concern 
to others was evidenced by the fact that he was able to move out of the setting without destroying it.   
The entry then moves to consideration of Edwards and O’Leary. Both of these men exhibited a 
“steadfast, active intelligence,” but they were keyed in very different ways to their fellow shipmates. 
O’Leary was liked by all for his humor and openness, while Edwards could only express his capacity for 
joy and friendship thorough his work. Edwards is then recollected in the defining action of taking on fuel 
in high seas. It was Edwards’ task in such situations to hold the ship to course. On this particular 
occasion it seemed almost impossible for the ship to get close enough to take on fuel without smashing 
into the other ship or without parting the fuel lines. They, however, succeed in doing it through 
Edwards’ perfect attunement to the situation. Edwards did not withhold himself from the situation and 
try to overcome it through overpowering it. Nor did he just try to endure it. Neither of these would have 
been sufficient to hold a course in such a difficult sea. Rather, he opened himself to the situation and 
thus came to be both contained and sustained within it. He came to be in a perfectly responsive 
relationship with the occurrent which allowed him to steer the ship so that it came to “dance from sea 
to sea” (193).   
We then returned to a consideration of O’Leary and Edwards with reference to how one could be fair to 
both in light of their differing personalities. Everyone on board ship was inclined to like O’Leary while 
most were indifferent to Edwards. How could one get underneath one’s prejudices an do justice to both 
men, while still allowing the variable of personality to come into play? That is, how could one respond 
appropriately to each of them? Henry noted that it has been his experience that as he comes to people 
on a level of candor, the strain of the relationship eases - even with those towards whom he is at least 
initially antipathetic. Albert suggested that in order to do justice to people you must meet them in their 
defining moments. If this is in fact the case then a procedural or formal conception of justice will always 
fail. (Henry noted that the New Testament never gives a definition of what a neighbor is, rather, it shows 
how a person could become your neighbor. Also, the parable of the workers in the vineyard in the New 
Testament was cited in reference to the question of a procedural definition of justice. It is offensive to 
those who come early, that those who come later in the day receive the same reward. Those who come 
early want a formula so that they will know in advance how much everyone will get. Similarly, in the Old 
Testament the constant temptation of the Israelites to become at ease in Zion is the temptation to 
construe adherence to the Mosaic Law as the sufficient condition for right action, i.e., the temptation to 
interpret the covenant as a contract.)  
The entry of Monday, October 5 again addresses this problem of fairness with people. Should one 
attempt to get relations under control by being objective or by being subjective? In the objective 
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approach we withhold ourselves from the situation. We take the dual position of judge and participant. 
If we are objective with another, we extend such rights as we might claim, to the other. We treat the 
other abstractly , as an instance or case. Subjectivity, however, is just the mirror image of this. It is the 
submission of the self to the other. Neither way seems to be an authentic mode of being with another. 
They both leave out the possibility of the transfiguration of inclination that may obtain when we are 
truly with another.   
The same theme was taken up in the entry of Tuesday, September 29 with reference to Utilitarianism 
and Pragmatism as examples of teleological ethics. Both philosophical positions see that which 
structures our ethical conduct as a goal extrinsic to action. But, if this is the case then obviously our 
relations with others must be guided by this goal. In so far as possible then we must get others under 
control so that we can achieve our end. When this happens we have reduced others to mere 
contingencies and we are no longer with them. (Henry noted that efforts at reform are always imperiled 
in this respect. They often degenerate into the attempt to control others so that one can attain the 
needed reform. The others come to be seen as merely obstacles to the realization of the end.)   
 
  
